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LOCAL LEGISLATION IN THE NORTH
CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY
JosEPH S. FERRELL*

Legislation minutely regulating the affairs of individual local
governments is a long-established tradition in North Carolina. From
one-half to three-quarters of the laws enacted by a typical General
Assembly apply to only one or a few counties, cities or other political subdivisions and public corporations of the state. From time
to time reform of the local legislation tradition has been attempted,
but all efforts have met with little success due largely to the lack of
support for them from either members of the General Assembly or
local government officials.
The first of these movements to restrict local legislation culminated in 1917 in the adoption of art. II, § 29, and amendment of
art. VIII, §§ 1, 4 of the North Carolina Constitution. The major
portion of this article will be devoted to an investigation of the
legislative and judicial history of these sections of the constitution.
Since 1917 sporadic attempts to deal with the problem have met
with mixed success. The 1947 General Assembly created a study
commission "to make a thorough and complete study of the whole
problem of Public-Local and Private Legislation."' The commission's report, supported by exhaustive studies prepared by the Insti2
tute of Government under the direction of Professor Albert Coates,
recommended constitutional home rule for both counties and cities,
revision of existing general laws, and a substantial tightening of the
constitutional prohibitions against local acts. Its proposals were reported unfavorably by committee in the 1949 General Assembly.8
In 1955 bills were introduced proposing legislative home rule.' They
were reported favorably by committee and promptly defeated by
voice vote in the House of Representatives.
The proposals of the North Carolina Bar Association relating
* Assistant Professor of Public Law and Government, Institute of Government, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1 N.C. Sess. Laws 1947, Res. 24.
See Popular Government, Feb.-Mar. 1949 (entire issue).
'N.C. SEN. J. 1949, 479; N.C. HousE J. 1949, 842.
'See McMahon, County Home Ride and Local Legislation, Popular Government Mar. 1957, p. 3.
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to reform of the lower court system were more fortunate.5

In

1962 the people ratified extensive amendments to the constitution
designed primarily to create a uniform system of lower courts and
to prohibit local modification of the more essential features of the
court system." At the present time, with the single exception of
the court system, there appears to be no significant discontent in
North Carolina with ultimate legislative control over all phases of
each local decision-making process. There are constitutional restraints on the power of the General Assembly to enact local legislation, but they have been nibbled away by judicial interpretation
and largely ignored by the General Assembly. Occasionally the
courts have held a local act unconstitutional, but the general attitude
of the North Carolina Supreme Court and legislative practice have
fostered the widespread belief that art. II, § 29, of the constitution
is moribund.
How accurate this assessment of art. II, § 29, may have been
'In 1959 a committee of the bar association, commonly known as the Bell
Committee from its chairman and most fervid advocate, J. Spencer Bell,
now United States Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit, proposed major
reforms of the state court system. Its proposals were defeated in 1959, but
compromised and enacted in 1961. N.C. Sess. Laws 1961, c. 313.
and inequitable lower
6 Public discontent with the archaic, confusing
court system was the major impetus for the reforms. Thus, a uniform system
of lower courts is the most significant feature of N.C. CONST. art. IV as
revised by the 1961 amendments. To insure continued uniformity, the General Assembly is forbidden to enact local modifications on the following
aspects of the court system: the jurisdiction and powers of Clerks of Superior Court (art. IV, § 10(2)); the jurisdiction and powers of District
Courts and Magistrates (art. IV, § 10(3)); provisions for waiver of jurisdictional limits in civil cases (art. IV, § 10(4)); provisions for appeals
within the General Court of Justice (art. IV, § 10(5)); provisions for
removal of District Judges, Magistrates, and Clerks of Superior Court (art.
IV, §§ 15(2), (3)); provisions for prosecution of criminal actions in the
District Court, (art. IV, § 16(2)); and the schedule of court costs and fees
for all courts (art. IV, § 18).
There is some question as to when these restrictions take effect. In order
to allow for transition to the new system, art. IV, § 21, provides that the
article is not to become fully effective until January 1, 1971, or upon the
establishment of the District Court system in a particular county by the
General Assembly, whichever occurs first. As a part of the 1961 revisions
those sections of art. II, § 29, prohibiting local acts "relating to the establishment of courts inferior to the Superior Court," and "relating to the appointment of Justices of the Peace" were repealed. Thus, until article IV
becomes effective for a given county, it can be argued that there is no
constitutional restraint on the power of the General Assembly to enact local
modifications of its lower court system. On the other hand, the language of
art. IV, § 21, seems to assume that those local arrangements existing as of

1961 will continue unchanged until replaced by the new District Court sys-

tem.
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before 1961 is debatable, but legislators, local government officials,
and the legal profession do not seem to have yet grasped the full
significance of a line of cases which began with McIntyre v. Clarkson in 1961.7 These cases have invalidated several local acts on
grounds that they were based on an unreasonable classification. The
concept of classification of localities for the purpose of legislation
general in form but local in fact has long been in use throughout
the nation,' but before 1961 it was unfamiliar in North Carolina.'
As the court has developed this new line of decisions, it has rendered obsolete most if its former precedents on the subject and
raised by implication a question as to whether constitutional restraints on local legislation serve any useful function at all."° To
evaluate this broader question, attention to several subsidiary questions is necessary: (1) what policy did the 1917 local legislation
amendments intend to embody from the point of view of their
sponsors and advocates; (2) how has that policy been perceived
through time by the North Carolina Supreme Court; (3) what impact is the concept of classification now being developed by the court
likely to have on current legislative practices with respect to local
legislation; and (4) are there feasible alternatives to constitutional
regulation of the process of local legislation? Limitations of time
and space prevented consideration of the involvement of local legislation in questions of due process and equal protection."
I.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ARTICLE

II, SEC. 29.

Limitations on the authority of the legislature to enact laws pertaining to only one or a few individuals, corporations, counties,
cities, or other political subdivisions of the state, are found in the
1254 N.C. 510, 119 S.E.2d 888 (1961).
' See generally, authorities cited note 235 infra.
'There are a few examples. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153-251 to -266 (1964)
relates to planning and zoning areas for "counties having two or more cities
each having population in excess of thirty-five thousand (35,000) people ..... " The act was drawn to include only Guilford County which alone
meets such a description. N.C. GEx. STAT. § 130-128(18) (1964) applies
only to "sanitary districts which adjoin and are contiguous to any incorporated town and are located within three miles or less of the boundaries of
two other cities or towns." It was drawn to apply to the Green Meadows
Sanitary District in Rockingham County. See also note 91 infra.
1 See generally, authorities cited note 307 infra.
" See, e.g., State v. Carolina Racing Ass'n, Inc., 241 N.C. 80, 84 S.E.2d
390 (1954); State v. Felton, 239 N.C. 575, 80 S.E.2d 625 (1954); Brumley
v. Baxter, 225 N.C. 691, 36 S.E.2d 281 (1945); Edgerton v. Hood, 205 N.C.
816, 172 S.E. 481 (1934).
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constitutions of all but a handful of the states.'" They range from
such broad provisions as a prohibition of special acts on any subject which can be covered by a general law 18 to long lists of narrow
categories within which "private, local or special" acts are not permitted. 4 These constitutional restraints on legislative power were
the result of a national movement for legislative reform which began
in the 1840's in reaction to widespread corruption of the legislative
process in many of the states.' 5 North Carolina was the first state
to prohibit certain kinds of acts for the benefit or relief of individuals, and, with the exception of Alaska and Hawaii, the last to
restrict local government acts. Those portions of the North Carolina Constitution denying legislative authority over local government
laws were first effective for the General Assembly of 1917. This
section will discuss the circumstances of their adoption.
The first indication in North Carolina that procedures for enacting local government laws called for reform is a statute of 1796.1"
In that year the General Assembly provided that prior notice had to
be given of intention to present a petition" to the General Assembly
for the enactment of local laws
1

See generally,

ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW

CHAMBERLAIN,

(1936);

§ 2.12 (1966);
237-42
1953);

LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES: NATIONAL AND STATE
GRAVES, AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENT 283-89 (4th ed.

LTJCE, LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES 368-69 (1924); LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROBLEmS 53848 (1935); R.EINSCH, AMERICAN LEGISLATURES AND LEGISLATIVE
METHODS

304-07 (1907);

WALKER, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

341 (1948).

" E.g., ARx. CONST. art. V, § 25; KAN. CONST. art. II, § 17.
"E.g.,
ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 104.
5
" LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS 532-48 (1935).
" N.C. Laws 1796, ch. 466, § 2; MARTIN, PUBLIC ACTS OF THE GENERAL

ASSEMBLY OF N.C. 97 (1804). Cf. The instructions of the Board of Trade
to Governor William Tryon of New York in 1771, LUCE, LEGISLATIVE
PROBLEMS

540 (1935).

" Introduction of bills by petition from private citizens for redress of
grievances was common in colonial times and during the first half of the nineteenth century. The petition would be referred to a standing committee whose
task was to determine whether a bill granting the prayer of the petition
would be laid before the full assembly. The petition procedure was largely
responsible for the development of the committee system in American legis-

lative bodies.

HARLow, THE HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE METHODS IN THE

PERIOD BEFORE 1825 1-23 (1917).
In North Carolina the committee primarily responsible for sifting petitions was the Committee on Propositions and Grievances. HARLOW, THE
HISTORY oF LEGISLATIVE METHODS IN THE PERIOD BEFORE 1825 17 (1917).
This committee still survives but now considers alcoholic beverage control
bills almost exclusively. The petition procedure is preserved by implication
in N.C. HOUSE REP. R. 5 (1965) which designates "the receiving of petitions, memorials and papers addressed to the General Assembly or to the

House" as the first general. Petitions to the General Assembly have been
exceedingly rare in modem times.
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for the establishing a place or places of separate elections or general musters, or for removal of the seat of the courts of justice
in any of the several counties in the state, or for the erecting of
a toll-road, ferry or bridge, or of any other public matter wherein
the county at large is concerned ....18
This statute was evidently intended to insure that residents of a
county potentially affected by a petition for legislative action would
be familiar with the proposal in order that they might make their
views known to their representatives. There is no evidence that it
was regularly observed."
Even had the act of 1796 been enforced, it in no way impaired
the authority of the General Assembly to legislate individually for
each county and city. Restriction of this legislative power was not
even seriously considered in the constitutional convention of 1835,
which abrogated legislative power over certain types of "private"
matters.
The 1835 convention was called by popular vote to settle the
legislative representation controversy which had divided the stats
into two factions, East and West, for half a century.2" One of the
topics assigned to the convention by the convention act 2 ' was
whether some limits should be placed on the enactment of "private"
laws. The debates of the convention show clearly that the delegates
were not about to alter the prevailing practice of legislating individually for local governments-these were "public" matters, not
"private" ones. 22 Rather, the variety of "private" law condemned
,See note 16 supra.
1
A random examination of the journals of the Senate and House of
Commons for the sessions of the 1820's and 30's disclosed no indication that
affidavits of publication were produced for bills coming within the categories
of the act of 1796.
2 See generally, London, The Representation Controversy in Colonial
North Carolina, 11 N.C. HIST. REV. 255 (1934); LEFLER & NEWSOME, NORTH CAROLINA: THE HISTORY OF A SOUTHERN STATE 33341
(1954). Before the Revolution the factions pitted the Albemarle section
against the later-settled southern seaboard and piedmont sections.
" N.C. Laws 1834-35, ch. 1, 2. The Constitution of 1776 contained no
amendment procedures. The convention of 1835 was called by vote of the
people under an act of the General Assembly which specified the manner of
organizing the convention and the subjects it was authorized to consider.
To insure that the convention would not consider matters other than those
thought necessary by the General Assembly, the delegates were required to
take an oath that they would not exceed the limits of authority prescribed
by the act.
2" It is difficult to be precise in distinguishing between "public"
and
"private" acts of a legislative assembly. The terms have never been satis-
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factorily defined, and may connote different things in different contexts.
For example, in seventeenth century usage in both England and the colonies
the term "private act" could have meant nothing more than that the bill
was introduced by petition rather than on motion of a member of the legislature. In modern English parliamentary usage a "private" bill may mean
either one introduced without party backing, or a bill presenting a money
claim against the crown. CAMPION, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROCEDURE
OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 115-16, 199-201 (2d ed. 1947); HARiow, THE
HISTORY

OF LEGISLATIVE

METHODS

IN

THE PERIOD

BEFORE

1825 64-67

(1917). Later, as introductions came to be accomplished almost exclusively
by bill, the term "private" was used to describe the types of legislation most
often resulting from petitions in the past. The rules of the two houses of
the North Carolina General Assembly at first recognized private bills by
implication in requiring prior notice of intention to call up a public bill on
second reading, N.C. SEN. R. 13, 1842-43 N.C. LEG. Doc. 57, or providing
that no public bill should pass two readings on the same day without the
concurrence of 2/3 of the members, N.C. HousE OF COMMONS R. 50, 1842-43
N.C. LEG. Doc. 66. From 1858 to 1868 each house required separate calendars to be kept for public and private bills, and that Saturday should be
reserved for consideration of private bills. See, e.g., N.C. SEN. R. 27, 185859 N.C. LEG. Doc. doc. 4, p. 5; N.C. HousE OF COMMONS R. 53, 1860-61

N.C. LEG. Doc. doc. 4, p. 14. All references to private bills disappeared from
the Senate rules after 1868 but the House continued to specify that separate
calendars be kept for public and private bills. N.C. HOUSE R. 49, 1876-77
N.C. LEG. Doc. doc. 11, p. 18. The current rules of the House of Representatives draw a distinction between public and local bills in three instances:
the number of copies required for introduction of a bill, N.C. HOUSE R. 34
(1965); the requirement that separate public and local calendars be kept,
N.C. HOUSE R. 41 (1965); and an exception for local bills from the rule
that a measure once defeated may not be revived except by 2/3 vote, N.C.
HOUSE R. 43(b) (1965). The current Senate rules distinguish between
public and local bills in the order of business, N.C. SEN. R. 6 (1965); the
number of required copies for introduction, N.C. SEN. R. 38 (1965); a deadline date for introduction of local bills, N.C. SEN. R. 40 (1965); and the
requirement of separate public and local calendars, N.C. SEN. R. 47 (1965).
The rules have never offered any definition of "private" or 'local" bills,
and the decisions necessary for legislative procedures distinguishing between local or private bills and public bills have been made by the principal
clerks and presiding officers according to unwritten, traditional criteria.
Quite distinct from the conception of private or local bills for internal
procedural purposes was the classification of acts for the purpose of publishing the laws enacted by the General Assembly. From the beginning this has
been done under the direction of the Secretary of State. As early as N.C.
Laws 1785, ch. 27, the Secretary of State was directed to have the acts of
the General Assembly published in two separately numbered series, public
and private. Beginning with N.C. Pub. Laws 1854, ch. 36, public and private
laws were directed to be published in two volumes, primarily as an economy
measure since only the public laws were to be distributed free of charge to
sheriffs, registers of deeds, county solicitors and Justices of the Peace. The
Secretary of State's classification of a law as "public" would have been
made primarily on the basis of which laws would be essential for the administration of state and county government. Much of the confusion over what
constitutes a "public" act stems from the failure to recognize that the classification of acts as "public" and "local, special or private" began and continues
to be made on traditional criteria which vary with who makes the decision
and for what purpose.
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was that for the benefit or relief of named individuals, with heavy
emphasis on ending legislative divorce.2 3 A proposal that "the General Assembly shall have no power to pass any private law to effect
any object, that could be effected by a general law on the same subject" was rejected, 24 as were proposals to require all laws relating to
the administration of justice to be uniform throughout the state
and to levy a tax of ten dollars on the introduction of each private
bill. 25 Nowhere in the debates is there a suggestion that local government legislation should be curtailed, although some delegates expressed the hope that biennial sessions would reduce the number of
such acts and serve to remedy the confusion resulting from frequent
repeals and amendments in annual sessions.2 6
The convention proposed three amendments relating to "private"
acts. Two of these prohibited acts granting divorce and alimony,
changing names, legitimating bastards, and restoring convicted
felons to citizenship.
The General Assembly was to have power
to enact general laws on these subjects. The third amendment required 30 days' notice of intention to introduce any private bill,
28
under regulations to be promulgated by the General Assembly.
" PROCEEDINGS

&

DEBATES

OF THE

CONVENTION

OF NORTH

CAROLINA

[1835] 377-82 (1836).
William Gaston, a Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court and a
delegate to the convention, was particularly eloquent in his remonstrance
against legislative divorce. Opponents of divorce may well have believed
that the courts would be more conservative than the legislature in this regard. The opinions of the Supreme Court and a comparison of the number
of legislative and judicial divorces prior to 1865 tend to bear out that expectation. See Scroggins v. Scroggins, 14 N.C. 535, 542 (1832); JoHNsoN,
ANTE-BELLUm NORTH CAROLINA

(1963).
2

PROCEEDINGS

&

217-23 (1937); Note, 41 N.C.L. REv. 604

DEBATES OF THE

CONVENTION

OF NORTH

CAROLINA

[1835] 379 (1836).
"Id. at 163, 377.
"Id. at 172, 176, 194. One of the delegates suggested that a primary
cause of so much private legislation was that annual sessions of the General
Assembly did not have enough public business to keep the members occupied.
Another thought that members introduced private bills largely in an effort
to show their constituents that they were earning their keep in Raleigh.
2 N.C. CONST., amend. art. I, § 4,
3-5 (1835). These sections of the
old Constitution were incorporated into the Constitution of 1868 with only
minor changes in punctuation as N.C. CONST. art. II, §§ 10-12. Sections 10
and 11, which specify the prohibited categories of private legislation, have
never been construed by the North Carolina Supreme Court.
" This amendment, now N.C. CONST. art. II, § 12, provides:
The General Assembly shall not pass any private law, unless it shall
be made to appear that thirty days' notice of application to pass such
a law shall have been given, under such direction and in such manner
as shall be provided by law.
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The 1835 amendments had only a momentary impact on the
gross volume of legislation,29 even though they did relieve the General Assembly of some of the more vexatious categories of private
acts. By 1868 the largest single category of legislation, in terms of
number and length, included corporate charters-municipal, private
business, and public institution. The constitutional convention of
1868 took up this problem, but again there was no desire to limit
legislative power over local government. The framers of the new
constitution were content to admonish the legislature not to create
private business corporations by special act, but municipal corporations and public corporations under the control of the state were
specifically excepted." °
It was not until 1911 that local government acts were identified
as a significant impediment to the effectiveness of the legislative
process, due largely to the precipitous rise in the number of them
after 1879.3' During the forty-seven years between 1788 and 1835,
It is not clear whether this section of the Constitution was intended to
apply to local government bills. The debates of the convention are of little
help on the question. The section was not included in the original proposal
brought to the convention floor by the committee charged with drafting the
private bill amendments, but was offered as a floor amendment for the
committee's recommendation that a tax be imposed on the introduction of
private bills. The few remarks on the proposed section referred only to
legislative divorce, and expressed a preference for a notice requirement as
a deterrent to the introduction of these bills rather than a tax, which was
attacked as an infringement on the right of petition for redress of grievances.
See PROCEEDINGS & DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF NORTH CAROLINA

[1835] 377-78 (1936).

The 1835 General Assembly enacted a procedure for giving the required
notice, now codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-21 (1964), but the statute
was not invoked in the Supreme Court until 1908. All the cases construing
the statute have involved local government acts, and the court has consistently refused to interpret or apply it. The Court holds that it will
not look behind the ratification of the act to determine if the prescribed
notice has been given or not. Thus art. II, § 12, is non-justiciable, and the
General Assembly ignores it in practice. Matthews v. Town of Blowing
Rock, 207 N.C. 450, 177.S.E. 429 (1934); Gallimore v. Town of Thomasville, 191 N.C. 648, 132 S.E. 657 (1926); Cox v. Comm'rs, 146 N.C. 584,
60 S.E. 516 (1908).
2 See Appendix I.
30 N.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1868)
provided that the General Assembly
should not create corporations by special act "except for municipal purposes
and in cases where, in the judgment of the Legislature, the object of the
corporation cannot be attained under general laws." Between 1868 and 1917
the General Assembly chartered over 2,600 private business corporations
under the savings clause. Coates, The Problem of Private,Local and Special
Legislation and City and County Home Rule in North Carolina, Popular
Government, Feb.-Mar. 1949, p. 6.
" The statistics which follow are summarized graphically in the Ap-
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annual sessions of the General Assembly enacted an average of 120
bills each session, or a total of 240 for a biennium. Biennial sessions
from 1836 to 1860 enacted an average of 194 bills each. After the
Civil War the number of biennial enactments increased sharply.
From 1870 to 1885 the average was 425. This more than doubled
to 902 per session in the next eighteen years, and by 1915 the General Assembly was enacting an average of 1,404 bills in each regular
session, not to mention the 702 acts of special sessions in 1908 and
1913. By 1901 the General Assembly was enacting over three times
as many bills as it had in 1875. But this increase in legislative business was not accompanied by longer sessions. The constitution had
been amended in 1875 to provide that members of the General
Assembly should receive their per diem compensation for sixty days
only, and if they sat longer they were to serve without pay.12 As
a result, no session after 1875 lasted much beyond the sixty-day
limit on compensation. As more and more legislation was enacted
in the same short sixty-day period, the high proportion of local
government laws, corporate charters and private acts became a significant impediment to the efficiency of the legislative process. The
time was ripe for another move toward legislative reform.
Since the Governor of North Carolina has no veto, a bill becomes
law upon enactment of the same bill in identical form by both
houses of the General Assembly and ratification by the presiding
officer of each house. Under this arrangement, unique to North
Carolina, it is quite possible for the entire legislative process from
beginning to end to be performed by the members of the General
Assembly and their staff alone without the intervention of any
other officer of State. Until 1903 the General Assembly did just
that. At the end of the 1901 session the enrollment process, i.e., the
preparation of the final, official copy of each act for ratification,
pendices and were derived from Coates, The Problem of Private, Local and
Special Legislation and City and County Home Rule in North Carolina,
Popular Government, Feb.-Mar. 1949, p. 6.
2N.C. CONST. art. I, § 28 (1876). According to Chief Justice Walter
Clark, before the adoption of this section as much as a week of each session
was consumed in determining how much the members were to be paid.

Kendall v. Stafford, 178 N.C. 461, 468, 101 S.E. 15, 18 (1919) (concurring
opinion). Art. II, § 28, has been frequently amended to increase the allow-

able per diem, to lengthen the pay period, and to permit subsistence and

travel allowances. At present, members receive fifteen dollars per day for

a maximum of 120 calendar days, plus subsistence and travel allowances.
N.C. CoNsT. art. II, § 28; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 120-3, (1964), 138-5 (Supp.

1965).
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was entrusted to the Secretary of State.3 3 J. Bryan Grimes, then
Secretary of State, immediately reformed the enrolling office, among
other things substituting typewriting for manuscript.34
Grimes soon became deeply concerned over the effect of the large
number of enactments near the end of the session on the accuracy
of the ratified acts. 5 By legislative custom, action on most major
bills was delayed until late in the session. The closing days of the
General Assembly were characterized by marathon sessions, mountainous calendars, and an atmosphere of frenzy. If the session
lasted much beyond the sixty-day compensation period, many legislators simply went home, leaving a rump session to complete the
work. 6
In his 1907 Report to the General Assembly, Secretary of State
Grimes noted that more than half of the acts of the 1905 session
were sent to the enrolling office in the last ten days.3 The 1907
rush was even worse. Out of 1,535 acts in 1907, 1,245 were ratified
in the last twenty days, 901 in the last ten days, and 237 on the last
day of the session. "In such rush work it is almost impossible to
have it properly done," Grimes complained."
Probably at Grimes' suggestion, Governor W. W. Kitchin made
legislative reform a major part of his legislative program for
1911."9 In his message to the 1911 General Assembly, Governor
"N.C. Pub. Laws 1901, ch. 631. This act was revised and reenacted by
by N.C. Pub. Laws 1903, ch. 5 which is now codified as amended in N.C.
GEN STAT. § 120-22 (1964).
8 1903 N.C. SEC'Y OF STATE BIENNIAL REP. 9-10.

" In each of his biennial reports from 1903 to 1915, the Secretary of
State called attention to the intolerable situation in the enrolling office during
the latter weeks of the session.
"Raleigh News & Observer, Mar. 10, 1915, p. 4, col. 2.
'7 1907 N.C. SEC'Y OF STATE BIENNIAL REP. 6-7.
88 1909 N.C. Sc'Y OF STATE BIENNIAL REP. 8.
89 Unless the handling of local bills was substantially different in 1911
than it is today, it is difficult to believe that the governor could have been
too serious in his suggestion that a reduction in the local bill load would
leave the General Assembly with more time to devote to public matters.
The legislative practice of postponing action on major bills until late in the
session stems from other roots, among which are the period of time required
for legislators to become acquainted with each other, the necessity in many
instances of awaiting passage of the revenue and appropriations acts, and
the advantage of allowing public opinion to crystallize around controversial
issues. That these considerations are not new revelations by latter-day political scientists is strikingly brought out by the debates of the 1835 Convention
over whether to adopt biennial rather than annual sessions. See PROCEEDINGS & DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF NORTH CAROLINA [1835] 165-78,

184-201 passim (1836).
On the other hand, Grimes and his staff were immediately affected by
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Kitchin had this to say about the ninety per cent of the legislative
product which could be characterized as "special legislation :"
Special legislation is the greatest curse of government and
our General Assemblies under the present system have fallen a
prey to this evil. Happily with us the evils of special legislation
have usually been negative rather than positive. Special and local
interests have usually been content with taking the time and attention of the General Assembly to the great hindrance and often
to the exclusion of public questions and general legislation. But
even the negative feature of this evil has become a menace to the
public welfare. The enormous number of local and special acts,
often of the most trivial nature, which are thrust upon the General Assembly is appalling, taking the time and consuming the
energy of the members and greatly depriving the important public
matters during the short sixty days sessions, of that study, deliberation, and action, which the people's interest demands.
The General Assembly is for general legislation. Special legislation is contrary to the genius of our institutions and local relief
should be administered by the localities interested under general
laws. It is useless to expect the General Assembly to remedy the
evil. It cannot adopt any permanent rule... . To lengthen the
sessions or make them less frequent would only increace the evil.
The only remedy lies in amendments to the constitution. By
proper constitutional limitations the General Assembly can be relieved of a great burden and be left with ample power to pass
general laws which will provide for special and local relief, more
justly and speedily through the courts, the different departments
of State, the boards of aldermen of the cities and towns, the county commissioners, and by vote of the people in the localities affected.

40

the large volume of relatively minor legislation, particularly late in the session, and Grimes had been calling the matter to public attention at least
since 1905. His appearance before the 1913 Constitutional Commission to
give information on constitutional limitations on local legislation in other
states indicates he was sufficiently interested in the subject to have undertaken an extensive research job. After the final adoption of the amendments
intended to curtail local legislation, Grimes had nothing more to say about
the subject in his biennial reports, even though the amendments had little
noticable effect either on the total volume of legislation or the adjournment
rush.
The absence of documents in the official papers of Grimes and Kitchin
deposited in the State Archives tending to corroborate the contention that
Grimes was the prime mover of the Kitchin proposals is not surprising.
Both men occupied offices on the same floor of the Capitol and would probably have discussed such matters in conversation rather than writing.
,0 1911 BIENNIAL MESSAGE OF Gov. W. W. KITCEIN TO THE GENERAL
ASSEmBLY 22-25.
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To implement his policy that "the General Assembly is for general legislation," the Governor advocated amending the constitution
to prohibit legislation on twenty-two subjects, including: charters of
cities and private business corporations; county, town, township and
school district affairs; change of place names; establishment and
maintenance of streets and roads; ferries and bridges, or ferry or
bridge corporations; vacation of roads, plats and streets; cemeteries
and public grounds not owned by the State; local courts; salaries of
jurors and county commissioners; erection of new townships and
school districts; creation of offices or prescription of the compensation, powers or duties of officers of counties, towns and school districts; regulation of salaries and powers of city aldermen, justices
of the peace and constables; regulating the public schools, the building of school houses, or the raising of revenue for these purposes;
remission of fines, forfeitures or taxes legally paid into the public
treasury; exempting property from taxation; regulating labor and
trade; granting exclusive rights, privileges or immunities to any
individual or corporation; extending the time for tax assessment and
collection; validating informal wills and deeds; and validating unauthorized or invalid acts of public officers."
Secretary of State Grimes heartily endorsed the Governor's proposals for legislative reform. "It is probably safe to say," he wrote,
"that two-thirds of the laws enacted by the General Assembly relate
to matters which the attention of the legislature should not be distracted with." The adjournment rush he characterized as "an injustice to the State and a menace to safe legislation."'
Nothing came of Governor Kitchin's proposals in the General
Assembly of 1911. But added urgency was given to the reform
movement by the new system devised in 1909 for publication of the
acts of the General Assembly. 8 For the first time the acts were
published in three categories: public, public-local, and private. 44
"All laws of State-wide application" were included in the public
laws; "laws of a public nature but of only local application" were
classified as public-local; and "all charters and laws in relation to
cities and towns" were published as the private laws. 5 This system
,Id. at 23-24.
421911 N.C. SEc'Y OF STATE BIENNIAL REP. 20.
"'N.C.Pub. Laws 1909, ch. 473.
"See note 22, supra.
"N.C. Pub. Laws 1911 at 387 (explanatory note by the Secretary of
State).
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brought out clearly what had been the fact for at least 120 years: well
over three quarters of the acts of each session of the General Assembly was devoted to public-local and private matters.46 In 1911
nearly ninety per cent of the acts were in these categories.
Governor Kitchin renewed his requests for reform to the General Assembly of 1913.' 7 A bill was introduced at that session which
embodied all of the categories suggested by Kitchin in 1911 except
those relating to city charters and local courts, and including two
not mentioned by the Governor: bills relating to wildlife protection,
and regulating the cleaning or use of streams. 4 However, the large
number of bills proposing other major revisions to the constitution
soon made it clear that a regular session of the General Assembly
could not cope with the pressures for constitutional amendment unless it was to neglect all else. 49 Rather than call a convention, the
1913 General Assembly created a study commission charged with the
duty of considering and making recommendations concerning those
bills introduced at that session proposing constitutional amendments."0 The Governor was requested to call a special session upon
completion of the commission's work for the express purpose of
considering constitutional amendments.
Most of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of
1913 were concerned with revision of the state's tax structure, but
" In 1911, 270 public laws and resolutions occupied 347 pages of print,
733 public-local laws took 1,263 pages, and 472 private laws 1,086 pages.
By contrast, the 1965 session laws, consisting of 1,302 laws and resolutions,
were printed in 1,707 pages.
' 1913 BIENNIAL MESSAGE oF GOVERNOR W. W. KITCHIN TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 11. The Governor concluded; "Your body is able and
patriotic, but you are overwhelmed with local and private bills which should
not consume your energy and time. Many reforms are needed through the
Legislature, and these will be quickened if you will provide for genuine
legislative reform, so that the General Assembly can give its time and
ability to general public legislation." Ibid. (At that time the out-going
governor delivered the executive message to the legislature rather than the
newly elected governor because the legislature usually convened within less
than a week of inauguration day.)
AsS.B. 183, N.C. General Assembly 1913.
" Taken together, the proposals were enough to occupy a convention.
Among them were bills to give the governor the veto power, make major
revisions in the constitutional limitations on state and local taxation, and to

institute the initiative and referendum. Copies of the bills are included in

the typescript copy of the Minutes of the 1913 Commission on Constitutional
Amendments deposited in the State Archives.

" N.C. Pub. Laws 1913, Res. 17. The Commission was composed of eight
members appointed by the Speaker of the House, five appointed by the
President of the Senate, and five appointed by the Governor.
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legislative reform received a good measure of attention. 5 ' The 1913
bill for restriction of legislative power over the subjects proposed
by Governor Kitchin in 1911 was referred to a committee of the
Commission, along with proposals to increase legislative pay, establish initiative and referendum, and give the governor the veto
power.5 2 The bill emerged from committee shorn of most of its
significance. As proposed to the Constitutional Commission of 1913,
a new art. II, § 29, would have prohibited "local, private or special
legislation :"

changing the names of cities, towns, and townships;
authorizing the laying out, opening, altering, maintaining, or discontinuing highways, streets or alleys;
relating to ferries or bridges;
relating to game or hunting;
relating to non-navigable streams;
relating to cemeteries;
relating to the pay of jurors;
erecting new townships, or changing township lines, or the lines
of school districts;
remitting fines, penalties, and forfeitures, or refunding moneys
legally paid into the public treasury;
exempting property from taxation;
regulating labor, trade, mining or manufacturing;
extending the time for the assessment or collection of taxes or
otherwise relieving any collector of taxes from the due performance of his official duties, or his sureties from liability;
53
giving effect to informal wills and deeds.
In the full Commission, unsuccessful efforts were made to strike
out the clauses relating to streets and wildlife protection.54 A new
clause "relating to health, sanitation and abatement of nuisances"

" N.C.
THE

COMM'N ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 1913, MINUTES OF
[hereinafter cited as 1913 COMMISSION MINUTES].

SESSIONS (1913)

Page references given here are to the printed version of the minutes, but the

best source is the original typescript which contains the bills referred to the
commission and the tally sheets of votes taken on each proposal, neither of
which were included in the printed version.
2

" Among the members of this sub-committee was W. A. Devin, later to
become Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court. Since the committee report was signed by Devin, he probably drafted the final text of art.
II, § 29, as proposed by the Commission. Unfortunately, Chief Justice Devin
never discussed the intent of the Commission or the General Assembly in an
opinion of the Court although he had several opportunities to do so.
' 1913 COMMISsION MINUTES 37-38.
8, Id. at 52-53.
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was added, and the proposed section was unanimously adopted by
the Commission. 5
Another committee of the Commission proposed a revision of
art. VIII, § 1, designed to prohibit corporate charters by special act,
but city charters would have been excepted.5 6 After an amendment
had been offered to strike the language making an exception for city
charters, 57 Secretary of State Grimes was invited to address the
Commission to give "certain information ... showing the number

of states in the Union which have this provision."' 8 The amendment
was adopted, and the revised art. VIII, § 1, prohibited the General
Assembly from enacting any corporate charter by special act.59
The Commission's recommendations were introduced in both
houses of the General Assembly at the extra session of 1913, called
especially to consider its proposals.' The amendments to art. VIII,
§§ 1, 4, were adopted as proposed by the Commission," but slight
modifications were made in the new art. II, § 29, which was to
restrict legislative power over "local, special and private" acts. The
House struck out the clause relating to tax exemptions, and limited
the road and ferry and bridge clauses to cases where the proposed
improvement lay entirely within one county.6" The Senate struck
out the wildlife protection clause and added clauses "relating to the
establishment of Recorder's Courts; relating to dog tax; relating to
salaries of county officers; and relating to appointment of Justices
'1Id. at 53-54, 71.
" Id. at 61. The section would have read:
"No corporation shall be created or its charter extended, altered, or
amended by special acts, except municipal and those for charitable, educational, penal or reformatory purposes that are to be and remain under the
patronage and control of the State ......
"Id. at 76. The previous day, Governor Locke Craig had addressed the
Commission, giving his views on the proposals before it. Id. at 66. I have
not found any text or report of the contents of the Governor's remarks.
8
I at 78.
1d.
'The amendment simply struck out the words "municipal and," see note
56 supra, and carried by a vote of 12-3. Art. VIII, § 1, as amended, carried
by a vote of 14-1. Id. at 79.
N
N.C.S. JoUR. Ex. Siss. 1913, 9; N.C.H. JoUR. Ex. SEss. 1913, 14.
1N.C. Pub. Laws Ex. Sess. 1913, ch. 81.
" H.B. 43, N.C. Gen. Assembly Ex. Sess. 1913. The street and bridge
clause read as follows:
Authorizing the laying out, opening, altering, maintaining, or discontinuing highways, streets or alleys, unless the said highways shall
extend into two or more counties;
Relating to ferries or bridges, unless said ferries or bridges shall
connect or effect [sic] two or more counties.
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of the Peace. 0' 3 The House refused to concur in the Senate amendment and a conference committee was appointed.
The conferees recommended that the House recede from its
amendments and accept the Senate clauses relating to local courts
and Justices of the Peace. The Senate was to recede from its position on the wildlife protection, dog tax, and county salaries clauses. 5
The conference report was adopted by both houses, and the amendments on local and private legislation were submitted to the people
along with several others.'
The entire package of amendments proposed in 1913 was defeated at the polls due to general dissatisfaction with the revisions
proposed for the state and local tax structure."T In 1915 the local
legislation amendments were again submitted along with a proposal
to allow the appointment of emergency superior court judges.0 8 The
bill passed both houses easily. 9 The only change which the 1915
" S.B. 601, N.C. Gen. Assembly Ex. Sess. 1913. This was a committee
substitute for the bill as originally introduced. (At that time, committee

substitutes were given a new bill number. Today, a committee substitute
retains the number of the original bill.)
N.C.S. JouR. Ex. SEss. 1913, at 244-47.
8' Ibid.

8' N.C. Pub. Laws Ex. Sess. 1913, ch. 81. Ten separate propositions were
submitted to the voters. The official ballot described them as follows:
I. Substituting the phrase, "War Between the States," for the
words "insurrection or rebellion against the United States," in
Article I, section 6, and the word "rebellion" in Article VII,
section 13.
II. Increasing compensation of members of the General Assembly
and decreasing milage.
III. Restricting local, private and special legislation.
Fixing the day of inauguration of the Governor.
To prevent delays in trials by providing emergency judges.
Removing obsolete sections from the Constitution.
Striking out Article V, and Section 9 of Article VII, and
substituting therefor an Article to Revise and Reform the
System of Revenue and Taxation.
VIII. To prevent special charters to corporations by the General
Assembly.
IX. To prevent special charters to towns, cities, and incorporated
villages.
X. To require six months Public School term.
Raleigh News & Observer, March 8, 1915, p. 4, col. 3.
"N.C. Pub. Laws 1915, ch. 99.
" The amendments passed the Senate by a vote of 43-1, N.C.S. JOUR.
1915, at 591, but encountered some difficulty in the House of Representatives
where they passed by a vote of 60-11, N.C.H. JouR. 1915, at 914. This vote
may raise an issue of whether the amendments ever became a valid part of
the constitution, for the bill did not pass by three-fifths of the entire membership of the House but by only three-fifths of those present and voting.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
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session made in the 1913 proposals was the omission of the wildlife protection clause from art. II, § 29. The amendments were
ratified at the polls in 1916 and became effective on January 10,
1917.70
As finally proposed by the General Assembly and ratified by the
people, three sections of the constitution modify the power of the
General Assembly to enact local government laws. Art. II, § 29,
until 1962, 71 provided:
The General Assembly shall not pass any local, private or
special act or resolution:
Relating to the establishment of courts inferior to the superior
court;
Relating to the appointment of justices of the peace;
Relating to health, sanitation and abatement of nuisances;
Changing the names of cities, towns and townships;
Authorizing the laying out, opening, altering, maintaining or
discontinuing highways, streets or alleys;
Relating to ferries or bridges;
Relating to non-navigable streams;
Relating to cemeteries;
Relating to the pay of jurors;
Erecting new townships, or changing township lines, or establishing or changing the lines of school districts;
Remitting fines, penalties and forfeitures, or refunding moneys
legally paid into the public treasury;
N.C. CONST. art. XIII, § 2, provides that constitutional amendments may be
submitted to the people by the General Assembly after "the same shall have
been agreed to by three-fifths of each house of the General Assembly." The
Supreme Court has never had occasion to decide whether this language requires three-fifths of those present and voting or three-fifths of the entire
membership. If the latter interpretation is proper, seventy-two votes are
required in the House of Representatives. In modern times the Speaker of
the House has invariably ruled that seventy-two votes are required for the
passage of a bill for amending the constitution, and several such bills have
been declared lost after receiving more votes than did the 1915 amendments.
o N.C. Pub. Laws 1915, ch. 99, § 8. The authority of the General
Assembly to fix the effective date of constitutional amendments under N.C.
CONsT. art. XIII, § 2, was upheld in Reade v. City of Durham, 173 N.C.
668, 92 S.E. 712 (1917).
Selection of January 10 as the effective date for the prohibition of local,
special and private bills was not arbitrary. The 1917 General Assembly
convened on January 6, 1917. It enacted 400 local bills before the 10th. To
complete the enrolling and ratification process before the deadline, all clerks
and typists working for the State in Raleigh were needed. N.C. Pub. Laws

1917, Res. 7.
"' See note 6 supra. N.C. CoNsT. art. II, § 29, is set out here as it read
before the 1961 amendment because several of the major cases construing it
involved the court clauses.
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Regulating labor, trade, mining or manufacturing;
Extending the time for the assessment or collection of taxes
or otherwise relieving any collector of taxes from the due performance of his official duties or his sureties from liability;
Giving effect to informal wills and deeds;
Nor shall the General Assembly enact any such local, private
or special act by the partial repeal of a general law, but the General Assembly may at any time repeal local, private or special
laws enacted by it.
Any private or special act or resolution passed in violation of
the provisions of this section shall be void.
The General Assembly shall have power to pass general laws
72
regulating matters set out in this section.

Art. VIII, § 1, directs that:
No corporation shall be created nor shall its charter be extended, altered, or amended by special act, except corporations
for charitable, educational, penal, or reformatory purposes that
are to be and remain under the patronage and control of the
State; but the General Assembly shall provide by general laws
for the chartering and organization of all corporations and for
amending, extending, and forfeiture of all charters, except those
above permitted by special act. All such general laws and special
acts may be altered from time to time or repealed; and the General Assembly may at any time by special act repeal the charter
of any corporation.73
Art. VIII,

§ 4,

further provides:

It shall be the duty of the Legislature to provide by general
laws for the organization of cities, towns, and incorporated villages, and to restrict their power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts, and loaning their credit, so as to
prevent abuses in assessment and in contracting debts by such
municipal corporations.
What can be gathered about the policies given constitutional
sanction by the adoption or amendment of these sections from their
legislative history and surrounding circumstances? First, it is clear
that the 1917 amendments were directed primarily toward local government legislation. Private legislation, in the sense of acts for the
"2The text has been conformed to the enrolled copy of N.C. Pub. Laws
1915, ch. 99, on file in the office of the Secretary of State. It differs somewhat in paragraphing, capitalization and punctuation from versions found
in various codifications of the Constitution.
" This section and art. VIII, § 4, have not been subsequently amended.

Both sections as set out here have been conformed to the enrolled copy.
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benefit or relief of named individuals, had been partially forbidden
by the 1835 amendments and there was no longer great pressure
for enactment of bills of this type. While acts chartering private
business corporations were far from uncommon, the large majority
of private corporations were already being chartered by the Secretary of State under general laws. 4 Nearly all of the General Assembly's non-general legislation related to local governments.
Of the local government acts to be prohibited, the intention to
eliminate city legislation was perhaps the clearest of all. Language
making a specific exception for municipal corporations was stricken
from the proposed revision of art. VIII, § 1, early in the deliberations of the 1913 Constitutional Commission. In 1915, this intent
was made even clearer by the proposed amendment to art. VIII, § 4,
directing the General Assembly "to provide by general laws for the
organization of cities. . .

."

Furthermore, the ballot on which the

proposed amendment to art. VIII, § 4, was submitted to the people
directed the voters to vote for or against an amendment "to prevent
special charters to towns, cities, and incorporated villages."7 5
Second, the General Assembly was not disposed to invoke significant limitations on its control over county government. The
original twenty-two categories proposed by Governor Kitchin for
inclusion in what eventually became art. II, § 29, would have eliminated virtually every common variety of county government act. Of
those eventually adopted, only restrictions on local acts relating to
roads, schools, and courts could have had major significance. The
crucial powers of fixing salaries and fees, prescribing duties, and
creating and abolishing county governments and offices at will were
all left within legislative control by local act.
Third, the primary purpose of the amendments was to relieve
the legislature of the burden of local bills. That the amendments
would have the incidental effect of strengthening local self-government was recognized, but given little attention. A pamphlet published in 1913 asking the people to endorse the local legislation
amendments submitted in that year stated that their objectives were
two: "(1) having many of these matters referred to boards of
county commissioners and the governing bodies of our towns;
(2) . . . affording the General Assembly liberty to engage in the
",From 1893 through 1917 the Secretary of State chartered over 15,000
corporations. 1919 N.C. SEC'Y OF STATE BIENNIAL REP. 4-5.

"'See note 66 supra,.
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consideration of matters of State-wide importance."7 6 The local selfgovernment justification was left with a bare statement as the writer
passed directly into an explanation of the second objective:
Every session of the General Assembly is congested with
thousands of bills of no general importance; matters that should
be the subject of uniform legislation, on the one hand, or local
self-government on the other. If this amendment shall be ratified
by the people they will emancipate the General Assembly from
its present bondage of local and special legislation and endow it
77
with liberty to attend to matters of interest to all the people.
Let the reader consider what it will mean to the commonwealth to have its General Assembly rid of the thousands of
little bills of no general value in order that it may treat the matters of great concern to all the people.
Professor J. G. deRoulhac Hamilton justified the amendments
as a means of getting rid of local legislation rather than a great
victory for local self-government. In a series of articles appearing
in the News and Observer in 1912-137s he discussed all of the matters which would eventually be submitted to the people, and came
to the conclusion that the prohibition of local legislation was the
most important of them:
Restriction of local legislation will tend to standardize our
law. It will save large sums of money and a great deal of time,
which after all in this case amounts to money. It will remove
from our statute books a mass of useless and confused law. It
may readily give to our people a large measure of local self-government, in itself an important step. And above all, and immeasurable more important, it will emancipate the legislature and make
- the position of legislator one of far more honor and importance
by giving him an opportunity for the careful, thoughtful, and
deliberate consideration of State problems and State issues.7 9
Finally, there was to be no constitutional home rule in North
Carolina. While the legislature was to be prevented from enacting
" THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CARoLINA: AN ADDRESS TO THE VOTERS [1913].

" Id. at 3. The amendments to article V, relating to the State and local
revenue system, and the amendments prohibiting local, special and private
legislation were considered the two most important proposals.

"8 HAMILTON,

A

PLEA FOR A

CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION

(1913).

(Pamphlet reprinted from articles appearing in the Raleigh News & Ob-

server Dec. 15, 22, 29, 1912; Jan. 5, 12, 19, 1913.)
Id. at 18.
79
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local laws on an individual basis, it was to accomplish the same
ends by "general laws." There were no guarantees of the right of
local self-government, no constitutionally protected home rule
powers, no initiative and referendum.80 Local government in North
Carolina would continue to be primarily the concern of the state.
Only the level of generality was to be raised.
I.

LOCAL LEGISLATION IN THE COURTS

While the American judiciary was succeeded brilliantly in using
its power of judicial review in the protection of individual rights
against invasion by legislative and executive decisions, the judges
have been most reluctant to oversee the organization and procedure
of other branches of the government when individual litigants have
not been substantially injured by allegedly irregular action. The case
or controversy and political question doctrines were developed to
avoid judicial involvement in foreign policy and political quarrels.
Only recently has the appointment and composition of legislative
bodies become a justiciable question. Legislative procedure, with
but few exceptions, cannot be questioned in the North Carolina
courts."1 When a cause is justiciable, there is always the power of
interpretation. Generally, American courts tend to interpret constitutional restrictions on legislative power as narrowly as possible
where individual rights are not immediately involved. Reform of
the legislative process has had to come from pressures outside the
court system.
As Governor Kitchin observed in his 1911 message to the North
Carolina General Assembly, internal legislative reform is difficult to
achieve except through the power of proposing constitutional amendments.8 2 One session of the legislature cannot bind its successors by
rule or statute. One long-standing dilemma of legislative reform,
then, has been that it is usually attempted in the states by constitutional provisions which are only reluctantly enforcible in the courts,
if at all.
80 Home rule was not even proposed. The initiative and referendum was
endorsed by the 1913 Constitutional Commission but rejected by the General

Assembly. See REPORT
MdENTS 7-8 (1913).

OF [THE] CommIssioN ox CoNsTITuTIoNAL AMEND-

8 E.g., Frazier v. Board of Comm'rs, 194 N.C. 49, 138 S.E. 433 (1927);
Gallimore v. Town of Thomasville, 191 N.C. 648, 132 S.E. 657 (1926) ; Commissioners v. DeRosset, 129 N.C. 275, 40 S.E. 43 (1901).
" See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
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The North Carolina Supreme Court has had, on numerous occasions, the duty of construing those sections of the constitution limiting legislative power over local, special and private legislation. It
has not been a friend to those who would restrict legislative power
in this area. As might be expected of a series of decisions extending
over fifty years, the cases display a gradual but distinctive
shift in judicial attitude toward the local legislation amendments.
Initially, the court was openly antagonistic to claims that the 1917
amendments significantly restricted legislative power over the structure and powers of local government. Subsequently, a marked relaxation of this attitude developed, and recently the court has shown
signs of breathing new life into constitutional provisions long
thought to be a dead letter. Because its recent decisions depart radically from the attitude and doctrines displayed in cases decided
before McIntyre v. Clarkson (1961),3 the case law construing art.
II, § 29, and art. VIII, §§ 1, 4, is best comprehended as following a
three-stage chronological development rather than a single line of
decisions from which a single set of principles is abstracted. This
section will discuss these cases in three periods: 1917-1938, the
period of strict construction; 1939-1961, the period of reappraisal;
and 1961 to the present, the period of McIntyre v. Clarkson.
A. Strict Construction-1917-1938
1. The Road Cases.-The first North Carolina case interpreting
art. II, § 29, concerned a local act authorizing the issuance of township bonds and the levy of a special tax "for road purposes." The
plaintiff in Brown v. Road Comm'rs4 contended that the act offended
against the clause of art. II, § 29, which forbids local acts "authorizing the laying out, opening, altering, maintaining, or discontinuing
[of] highways, streets, or alleys," and asked for an injunction
against the bond issue and tax referendum. The court held that
since the act in question did not relate directly to road construction
or maintenance but only to the financial arrangements to be made
for this purpose, it did not violate art. II, § 29. s1
See note 232 infra and accompanying text.
173 N.C. 598, 92 S.E. 502 (1917).
8'While the 1917 General Assembly had set up general law procedures
for the administration of road improvement programs by counties, townships and special districts, it had made no special arrangements for financing
these projects. See N.C. Pub. Laws 1917, ch. 284.
83
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Brown left open the question of whether financial arrangements
for specific road projects were unconstitutional since it dealt with
a bond issue and taxes for general road purposes. Mills v. Board
of Comm'rs0 and Martin County v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co."7
settled this question in favor of a complete removal of bond and tax
legislation from the purview of art. II, § 29, insofar as road construction is concerned. Mills upheld a local act authorizing a bond
issue for the purpose of "rebuilding bridges over the Catawba River
between Iredell and Catawaba Counties." While the court did not
say so, the act contemplated the reconstruction of specific bridges
which had been swept away by an unprecedented flood.8" The Martin County case upheld an act authorizing the issuance of bonds for
and apportionment of the expense of building a bridge across the
Roanoke River between Martin and Bertie Counties. The general
law would have required the two counties to bear the expense of
the bridge in proportion to the number of taxable polls in each although most of the benefit of its construction would accrue to the
citizens of Williamston in Martin County. Except for the western
approach, all of the construction lay in Bertie County. The local
act provided that Martin County would pay three-fourths of the
cost and Bertie County one-fourth.
Thus, in the space of but two years the court all but removed
from art. II, § 29, the single most numerous category of local
acts-those relating to road construction. The court would require
a direct connection between road construction and the act under
challenge, and financial arrangements were held to be indirect.
Mills and Brown were primarily concerned with financial matters. Road Contm'rs v. Bank of Ashes9 involved a local act creating
a special road commission 0 for Ashe County and also authorizing
a bond issue. A strict interpretation of Mills and Brown could have
upheld the bond issue without validating the creation of special
machinery for local road administration, but the court upheld the
entire act. The court found that the local act contained no provision
175 N.C. 215, 95 S.E. 481 (1918).
178 N.C. 26, 100 S.E. 134 (1919).
88 See State v. Kelly, 186 N.C. 365, 119 S.E. 755 (1923).
80181 N.C. 347, 107 S.E. 245 (1921).

ON.C. Pub.-Loc. Laws 1919, ch. 467. In the same year the general road
laws were substantially revised. N.C. Pub. Laws 1919, ch. 68, 232, 279, 312,

329.
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for laying out any specific road but merely provided the funds and
administrative apparatus for doing so. 1
In State v. Kelly92 the defendant was convicted for refusing to
work on the public roads as required by a local act. 3 He challenged
his conviction on grounds that the local act related to road maintenance and was therefore void under art. II, § 29. In a long opinion
the court candidly expressed its antagonism toward further suits
challenging local road acts. Long passages are devoted to extolling
the beneficience of local road acts to which the court attributed the
success of the state road program. As for local legislation in general, the court stated:
The discussion in the [Brown] opinion seems to limit the prohibition of special legislation only to those matters which, under
the general law, could be as well done by local authorities as by
the Legislature itself. Where, then, the general authority of a
local governmental agency was defective in a particular case,
and what is to be done could be done only with the authority of
the Legislature, then the prohibition of section 29
94
apply.

. . .

does not

This amounts to saying that local acts are permissible on any subject forbidden by art. II, § 29, if the General Assembly does not see
fit to enact adequate general laws to accomplish any objective desired by local authorities. The court has not subsequently applied
or discussed this rule of interpretation.
What, then, was left of the road clause of art. II, § 29, after
these initial cases? In Day v. Commissioners" the Court invalidated
a local act directing the county commissioners of Surry and Yadkin
"1Accord: Huneycutt v. Board of Comm'rs, 182 N.C. 319, 109 S.E. 4
(1921). This doctrine was foreshadowed in Parvin v. Board of Comm'rs,
177 N.C. 508, 99 S.E. 432 (1919). At the same term the court upheld an

act authorizing co-operative action with counties in adjoining states for the
construction of bridges over rivers forming the state boundary. Since only
the Catawba River, forming the boundary between Mecklenburg County and
South Carolina, fits this description, the act was in fact a local act. Emery v.
Commissioners, 181 N.C. 420, 107 S.E. 443 (1921); N.C. Pub. Laws 1919,
ch. 103; N.C. Pub. Laws Ex. Sess. 1920, ch. 11.
92 186 N.C. 365, 119 S.E. 755 (1923).
" Road maintenance laws under which all able-bodied men of the county
were obligated to work on the public roads a certain number of days each
year or to pay for a substitute, had long been in use in this state. The
system was held constitutional under both the federal and state constitutions
in State v. Wheeler, 141 N.C. 773, 53 S.E. 358 (1906).
9"186 N.C. at 373, 119 S.E. at 760.
191 N.C. 780, 133 S.E. 164 (1926).
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Counties to construct one bridge across the Yadkin River at a place
described in the act. Glenn v. Board of Educ.98 struck down a local
act closing a specifically described street. Other cases upheld acts
ratifying municipal street assessment rolls, 97 transferring jurisdic-

tion over roads formerly administered by the county to a newly
incorporated municipality,9" authorizing the levy of special assessments for street improvement without petition,99 and enlarging the
jurisdiction of a town over maintenance of streets to include sideBy 1936 it was well settled that the road clause
walks and alleys.'
of art. II, § 29, applied only to acts relating to the laying out, opening, altering or discontinuing of "a given particularand designated
highway street, or alley."'
2. The School Cases.-Next to the road cases, suits challenging
local acts relating to the school system constitute the most numerous
categories of cases construing art. II, § 29, in the period from 1917
to 1938. The first of these invalidated a local act, forecasting a
somewhat more liberal attitude toward the school clause of art. II,
§ 29, than was to be the case with the road clause. Board of Trustees v. Mutual Loan & Trust Co.10 2 was an action for specific performance to compel the defendant bank to honor its contract to
purchase school bonds issued by a school district pursuant to authority granted by a local act. The bank resisted on grounds that the
act undertook to create the school district and define its boundaries
and was therefore an act "establishing or changing the lines of
school districts." The plaintiffs, trustees of the school district,
sought to uphold the act under the Brown-Mills rule since the pri00210

N.C. 525, 187 S.E. 781 (1936).

(1926).
S.E.177
657S.E.
191 N.C.
o
0 0Gallimore
429
207 648,
N.C.132
450,
Blowing Rock,
Matthews v.v. Town
TownofofThomasville,
(1934).
v. Town of Lumberton, 211 N.C. 31, 188 S.E. 857 (1936). This
0"

Deese

case contains the fullest exposition of the court's position on the road clause
II, § 29.
of art.
1.0 Holton v. Town of Mocksville, 189 N.C. 144, 126 S.E. 326 (1925).
Deese v. Town of Lumberton, 211 N.C. 31, 34, 188 S.E. 857, 858
(1936). But cf., Hill v. Board of Comm'rs, 190 N.C. 123, 129 S.E. 154
(1925). This case construed an act "to take over the highway leading from
Mitchell's Fork via Gatesville, Buckland and Gates to the Virginia State
line.... ." and to relieve the townships through which it ran from the duty
of maintaining it. The court upheld the act. It is impossible to reconcile
this case with Deese except, as suggested by the court, on grounds that it
was merely declaratory of what the county could have done under the
general law, and therefore a decision that the local act was unconstitutional
would not affect the validity of the action taken.
10 181 N.C. 306, 107 S.E. 130 (1921).
101
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mary purpose of the act was to raise revenue. The court distinguished Brown and Mills on grounds that those cases concerned
roads that had already been validly established under general law
procedures, or local acts passed before the effective date of art. II,
§ 29. In this case, however, the school district was established by
the same act which authorized the bond issue. Since the General
Assembly had no authority to create the district, there was no legal
entity in existence which could issue the bonds in question. Therefore the defendant need not honor the contract.103
Woosley v. Comm'rs.. extended the Mutual Loan doctrine to
acts confirming invalid local action. In Woosley the county commissioners had attempted to create a special high school district
under the general law. The General Assembly subsequently authorized the district to issue bonds, incorporated it and provided it with
a special governing board. The court found that there were technical
defects in the procedures taken by the local authorities in creating
the district, and that since no district had been validly created the
legislature was without authority to confirm or validate the defective
local action without violating the school clause of art. II, § 29.105
Both Woosley and Mutual Loan were insignificant in their potential impact on school policy in general. There was ample authority under the general law for local authorities to create school districts, and these cases implied that the General Assembly had full
power to regulate school finances so long as it did not attempt to
create special school districts. Coble v. Comm'rs'0 6 was a more difficult case. In 1921 there were 113 local school districts in Guilford
County outside the Greensboro and High Point areas. The school
tax structure of the county was a welter of confusion. Some districts levied no special taxes at all, others levied a wide range of
rates and were indebted in varying amounts. The county secured a
local act in 1921 authorizing a county-wide referendum (outside
Greensboro and High Point) on whether the county should levy a
uniform special school tax and assume the indebtedness of the existing districts. While no district boundaries were affected, the act did
... Accord, Sechrist v. Board of Comm'rs, 181 N.C. 511, 107 S.E. 503
(1921). See also, Galloway v. Board of Educ., 184 N.C. 245, 114 S.E. 165
(1922).
104182 N.C. 429, 109 S.E. 368 (1921).
.0.
See also, Robinson v. Board of Comm'rs, 182 N.C. 590, 109 S.E. 855
(1921).
184 N.C. 342, 114 S.E. 487 (1922).
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have the effect of erecting the entire county outside Greensboro and
High Point into a special taxing district for school purposes. Arguing by analogy to Sechrist v. Commissioners,'° which had held that
the creation of a school district coterminous with the boundaries of
a designated township violated art. II, § 29, the plaintiff contended
that the act created a school district by implication. The court rejected this argument, holding that the General Assembly was not
prevented from creating "taxing districts" by the constitution.
[S]ince the school districts are retained with their former boundaries, and since the powers of the school committee in each
district are unchanged, and the organization of the schools is not
affected, we conclude that the act under which the election was
held is not in conflict with Art. II, sec. 29, of the Constitution.'"
In response to the court's suggestion, the General Assembly provided
by general law in 1923 for the creation of special school taxing
districts by the county commissioners. 0 9
Following the doctrines developed in the road cases, the court
held in other school cases during this period that the school clause
of art. II, § 29, did not prohibit acts increasing the limit of bonded
indebtedness of school districts" ° or authorizing bond issues and
special taxes."'
Since the decision in Brown v. Road Comm'rs,- the court had
seemed to be leaning toward a rule of interpretation which might be
stated thus: where the primary objective of an act is not related to
any of the categories of art. II, § 29, the fact that an "incidental
purpose" falls within the constitutional prohibitions does not invalidate the act. Two school cases made the rule explicit. Duffy v. City
of Greensboro"8s challenged an act revising and consolidating the
Greensboro city charter. The act provided that the territory embraced within the old city limits should continue to be an independent school district while territory newly annexed to the city should
remain in its county district. The court held that the primary purpose of the act was to extend the city limits of Greensboro and that
.0.
See Sechrist v. Board of Comm'rs, 181 N.C. 511, 107 S.E. 503 (1921).
108184 N.C. at 351-52, 114 S.E. at 491.
" N.C. Pub. Laws 1923, ch. 136.
110 Roebuck v. Board of Trustees, 184 N.C. 144, 113 S.E. 676
(1922).
11
Burney v. Commissioners, 184 N.C. 274, 114 S.E. 298 (1922).
173 N.C. 598, 92 S.E. 502 (1917).
111 186 N.C. 470, 120 S.E. 53 (1923).
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the recital that the annexation would not add territory to the existing city school district was only a necessary adjunct to the unquestioned authority of the General Assembly to revise municipal
boundaries.
Hailey v. City of Winston-Salem"-4 carried Duffy one step
further by holding that an annexation act which had the effect of
enlarging a school district defined by the city charter as being coterminous with the city limits was not prohibited by art. II, § 29.
Enlargement of the school district was "a mere incident in the accomplishment of the primary purpose of the Legislature,""' 5 which
was to annex territory to the city.
3. The Sanitary District Cases.-Two cases involving sanitary
districts contributed a peculiar doctrine to the interpretation of art.
II, § 29, which seemed to hold that when a local act applied generally to an entire county, it was not a local act. Prior to 1927 sanitary
districts had only rule making powers-they were not authorized to
provide water and sewer services." 6 By a local act in 1923 the
General Assembly set up a procedure for the creation of sanitary
districts in Buncombe County which would be authorized, to provide
water and sewer service in rural areas. 117 When this act was challenged in Reed v. Howerton Eng'r Co. as a local act "relating to
health, sanitation and the abatement of nuisances," the court held
that the act did not relate to health or sanitation, but that its only
purpose was "to provide districts in Buncombe County wherein
sanitary sewers or sanitary measures may be provided in rural districts."" s Standing alone, this case is remarkable only in the court's
propensity to avoid interpretation by flat negation, but Drysdale v.
Prudden,"9 decided four years later, interpreted it in a most singular
fashion.
The 1927 General Assembly prescribed a general law procedure
for the creation of sanitary districts with power to provide water
and sewer services. 20 At the same session the Druid Hills Sanitary
District was created by local act.'
The general law contained no
196 N.C. 17, 144 S.E. 377 (1928).
Id. at 23, 144 S.E. at 380.
116 See N.C. Pub. Laws 1913, ch. 154, §§ 4-5.
117N.C. Pub.-Loc.
Laws 1923, ch. 341.
118 188 N.C. 39, 44, 123 S.E. 479, 481 (1924).
14

195 N.C. 722, 143 S.E. 530 (1928).

10 N.C.

Pub. Laws 1927, ch. 100.
'21N.C. Priv. Laws 1927, ch. 229.
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limitation on the amount of bonds which could be issued by sanitary
districts or the rate of tax which could be levied. The Druid Hills
act contained limitations on both powers. Rather than proceed under
their local act, the residents of the Druid Hills district complied with
the general law procedures for the creation of a sanitary district
and held a referendum to authorize the issuance of bonds in excess
of the limit allowed by the local act. The prospective purchasers of
the bonds refused to honor their contracts since there was serious
doubt as to which law governed the transaction. The court held the
local act invalid and upheld the bond issue under the general law.
To reach this result they held that a local act creating a sanitary
district is an act relating to health and sanitation, a holding squarely
contrary to Reed v. Howerton Eng'r Co., 122 but refused to overrule
Reed. The court held that Reed was actually decided on grounds
that it "applied generally to the entire county of Buncombe,"'123 and
was not a local act. Therefore, the statements in Reed contrary to the
holding in Drysdale were dictum. This rationale also begs the question, but the bond issue was upheld and the rural residents of Druid
Hills had their water and sewer system.
4. The Local Court Cases.-Relatively few cases challenging
local acts "relating to the establishment of courts inferior to the
Superior Court" reached the supreme court between 1917 and 1938,
but the first of them, In re Harris,"4 represented the court's first
attempt to determine whether the act in question was "local" or
"general," conceding that it fell within one of the categories of local
acts prohibited by art. II, § 29. Harris had been convicted in the
recorder's court for Iredell County of selling spiritous liquors in
violation of the prohibition laws. After the time for appeal to the
superior court had expired, Harris filed his petition for habeas corpus, alleging that the court in which he had been convicted had no
jurisdiction either of his person or of the offense since it had been
unconstitutionally established. The superior court denied his application for the writ and Harris brought certiorari to the supreme
court.
The Iredell County recorder's court had been established by the
county commissioners under authority conferred on them by the
22

188 N.C. 39, 123 S.E. 479 (1924).

22 195 N.C. at 728, 143 S.E. at 533.
,183 N.C. 633, 112 S.E. 425 (1922).
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Recorder's Court Act of 1919.15 At the time of the defendant's
trial, the act applied to only fifty-six of the one hundred counties.' 26
Harris contended that the exemption of forty-four counties made
the act local. It was already clear that it related to the "establishment of courts inferior to the Superior Court." Therefore, Harris
argued, the act was void, the Iredell County recorder's court had
never been in legal existence, and his conviction was illegal.
The supreme court rejected Harris' contentions and held that
the act was a general law, not a local act. After discussing and
quoting from its former decisions, all of which construed acts involving two counties at the most, the court said:
Under these decisions and the construction they uphold as to the
true intent and meaning of these amendments, the statute in question would seem to be a valid law, and this, in our opinion, is
undoubtedly true when it is considered that the statute is designed
and intended to provide for as many as 56 out of the 100 counties
of the State, and could in no sense be regarded as a local or spe127
cial law within any usual or ordinary meaning of these terms.
The court did not elaborate on its test for determining whether an
act was local or general, but it appeared to be holding that if at
least one-half, fifty or more, of the counties were subject to a given
act it could not be "local."
In other cases the court established the important principle that
local acts expanding the jurisdiction of courts established under
general law procedures did not have the effect of "establishing" a
court.' 28 In this manner it became possible to provide for any vari-

ety of local court desired by having it established as a "recorder's
court" under the general laws and subsequently enlarging or con'2N.C. Pub. Laws 1919, ch. 277. This act is now codified, as amended
in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-185 to -264 (1953). It has already been superseded
in six judicial districts by the Court Reform Act of 1965, N.C. Sess. Laws
1965, ch. 310. On January 1, 1971 it will become unconstitutional by virtue
of N.C. CoNST. art. IV, § 21 (1961) if not totally superceded by that time.
..It originally exempted four judicial districts, most of a fifth, and ten
additional counties. Three counties were brought under the act in 1921.
N.C. Pub. Laws 1921, ch. 110.
127 183 N.C. at 636, 112 S.E. at 426.
28State v. Home, 191 N.C. 375, 131 S.E. 753 (1926); Durham Provision Co. v. Daves, 190 N.C. 7, 128 S.E. 593 (1925). Cf. Albertson v. Albertson, 207 N.C. 547, 178 S.E. 352 (1935) (semble).
The court also held that a local act establishing a court could be repealed,
as expressly stated in art. II, § 29. Queen v. Board of Comm'rs, 193 N.C.
821, 138 S.E. 310 (1927).
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tracting its jurisdiction by local act. Thus, the court clause of art.
II, § 29, became a dead letter.
5. Justices of the Peace: The Omnibus Bill.-In 1899 the General Assembly began to exercise the power it had acquired in 1875 to
appoint justices of the peace for each county.'29 From the first it
was customary to include appointments for many counties in one
bill, called an "omnibus bill."'3 0 Yet there were always many additional acts appointing one or two persons to the office, or a number
of persons for a single county.131
After the adoption of art. II, § 29, the General Assembly had
doubts as to the validity of the omnibus bill appointing justices of
the peace"3 2 and in 1919 the supreme court was asked for an advisory opinion on whether such a bill violated the clause of art. II,
§ 29, prohibiting local acts "relating to the appointment of Justices
of the Peace."' 33 The court replied without elaboration that the
omnibus bill did not violate the constitution.3 4
6. City Charters: The Demise of Art. VIII, § 4.-Few aspects
of the legislative intent of the 1915 proposals for restricting local
legislation are clearer than the intent to prohibit special acts granting or amending city charters.' 35 But the prohibition against special
act city laws lasted for only three sessions of the General Assembly
-1917,
1919 and the Extra Session of 1920. On December 1,
1920, the supreme court nullified the 1915 amendment to art. VIII,
§ 4, in the case of Kornegay v. City of Goldsboro.'36
The City of Goldsboro proposed to issue bonds in 1920 under
the Municipal Finance Act of 1917 in order to fund its existing
indebtedness. The proper procedures were followed but no purchasers could be found who would buy the bonds at par as required
...
N.C. CONST. art. VII, § 13, gives the legislature the authority to
"modify, change or abrogate" art. VII, § 5, (providing for local election of
justices of the peace) in addition to other sections of art. VII relating to

local government.

...
E.g., N.C. Pub. Laws 1913, ch. 184 (97 counties).
..There were about sixteen per session.
...
In 1917 the omnibus bill was rushed through before the January 10
effective date of art. II, § 29.
...
N.C. Pub. Laws 1919, Res. 34.
...
N.C.S. JoUR. 1919 at 327. This opinion, along with several others not
previously published in the official reports of the supreme court, was collected
by Dr. Preston Edsall of N.C. State University at Raleigh and printed as an
Appendix in 227 N.C. 715-26 (1947).
...
See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
"'3180 N.C. 441, 105 S.E. 187
(1920).
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by the general laws. The city obtained a local act at the extra session
of 1920 authorizing it to sell its bonds to the highest bidder even
though the bid might be less than par. Suit was then brought against
the city seeking an injunction against sale of the bonds on grounds
that the enabling act was unconstitutional under art. VIII, § 4. The
court divided three to two, Justice Allen for the majority upholding
the validity of the local act and construing art. VIII, § 4, as placing
only a duty on the General Assembly to enact general laws for the
governance of cities, not a prohibition against local acts. This was
precisely the interpretation given to art. VIII, §§ 1, 4 before the
1915 amendments.137 Chief Justice Clark and Justice Brown dissented in separate opinions, the Chief Justice asking that if the
1915 amendment to art. VIII, § 4, did not make any change, "for
what purpose was it solemnly enacted by the General Assembly, and
for what purpose did the the people ratify it at the polls ?""', After
this decision the only restraint on local legislation for cities was that
contained in art. II, § 29.
7. Judicial Attitudes Toward Local Legislation: 1917-1938.By its own admission the supreme court was most unfavorably disposed to suits seeking to invalidate local legislation under art. II,
§ 29, of the constitution during the first two decades after the adoption of this section. After the great hopes expressed by Governor
Kitchin, Secretary of State Grimes and others, it seems somewhat
peculiar that the Justices of the supreme court should take such a
dim view of the 1915 efforts at legislative reform. It appears, however, that the Justices were not being truculent. Judicial attitudes
toward art. II, § 29, from 1917 to 1938 can be explained in terms
of the fact that most of the cases being brought before them concerned the financing of local government.
In the second case construing art. II, § 29, Mills v. Board of
Comnm'rs,18 9 the court laid great stress on the argument that this

section of the constitution was intended to conserve legislative time,
not to impair the authority of the General Assembly to regulate the
37

Apparently this interpretation was so settled in practice that the issue

was never raised in the supreme court. Many of the cases interpreting art.

VIII, § 4, before the 1915 amendment involved local acts, and while the
court did not specifically address itself to the question of whether the consti-

tutional duty to provide for municipal incorporations prevented special acts,
the general tenor of the opinions assumed that it did not.
1-88180 N.C. at 456, 105 S.E. at 194.
139175 N.C. 215, 95 S.E. 481 (1918).
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financial affairs of local government. In response to the suggestion
that local acts authorizing road bonds and taxes were unconstitutional, the court observed:
It is now very well known that the limit of taxation allowable by
the Constitution for ordinary State and county purposes has been
very generally reached by the different counties in the State, and
for any additional demands or unexpected emergency authority
to exceed these limits can only be conferred by legislative enactment ...
An interpretation of these recent amendments which would
destroy or impair the legislative power to the extent suggested
would be of such serious and threatening consequence that it
should not be sanctioned except by provisions so plain of meaning
that no room for a different construction is allowable.1 40
Again, in Kornegay v. City of Goldsboro14 1 the court noted that
when the Municipal Finance Act was passed, requiring bonds to be
sold at par, "there was a ready market for bonds, while now it is
impossible to find a purchaser except at a discount .... ,,142 Martin
County v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 143 which reaffirmed the

Brown-Mills rule, stated that:
More than 150 statutes, authorizing the issuance of bonds for
constructing roads or bridges in certain counties, townships or
road districts therein named were passed at the last session in
reliance upon the Brown and Mills cases. Under the authority
of these statutes many hundreds of thousands of bonds have been
issued or are about to be issued, and contracts have been let or
are about to be let for the construction of roads and bridges in
therefore
all parts of the State. It is of the highest importance
144
that the authority of those cases shall be sustained.
What was the financial situation of North Carolina local government in the first third of this century? Restrictions on local
legislation in North Carolina came at an inopportune time. Just two
years after the ratification of the amendments restricting local legislation, the state embarked on a period of rapid expansion in education and internal improvement.1 45 Public education as a major
objective of state government was revived by Aycock and the Demo"Id. at 218, 95 S.E. at 482.
, 180 N.C. 441, 105 S.E. 187 (1920).
142

180 N.C. at 450, 105 S.E. at 191.

1,2178 N.C. 26, 100 S.E. 134 (1919).

178 N.C. at 35, 100 S.E. at 139-40.
See generally, LEFLER & NEWSOME,
...
OF A SOUTHERN STATE 561-72 (1954).
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crats in 1900. The increasing sale of automobiles was creating a
rapidly accelerating public demand for maintenance and paving of
roads. The end of the World War in 1918 enabled the people to
direct their primary attention toward internal improvement, and the
General Assembly was not long in reflecting the demand.
The role of local legislation in the expansion of the road and
school systems was paramount. Without it, progress would have
been much slower because of two major factors: (1) state policy
had always been to encourage and stimulate the counties to build
and maintain road and school systems, not to undertake primary
responsibility for these programs by state agencies; (2) both the
state and local revenue systems were cast in archaic constitutional
concrete which imposed unworkable limitations on the revenue base
and the tax rates. It was against a background of continuous efforts
to revise the state's revenue structure that the supreme court was
being asked to pass on the validity of local acts which were essential
stop-gap measures for bailing the counties out of an impossible
financial situation.
The taxation article of the Constitution of 1868 assumed that
the major source of state and local revenue would be an ad valorem
tax on property of all kinds, real, personal and intangible. 46 The
property tax had to be uniform, which meant that real estate, personalty and intangibles were all subject to the same rate. 14 7 In line
with its general policy of using county government as the primary
agency for administration of state policy, the entire tax assessment,
levy and collection processes were administered by county officials
under procedures prescribed by state law. 4 s Supposedly, all tax1. See N.C. CosT. art. V. Since 1868, amendments to the North Carolina Constitution have been incorporated into the text rather than added
separately at the end of the document, as with the United States Constitution and the North Carolina Constitution of 1776. This practice makes it
difficult to ascertain the wording of the constitution at a given point in time
by reading the current version codified in the General Statutes, although the
codifiers append carefully prepared historical notes to each section. The
most convenient source for the North Carolina Constitution is the version
printed at the front of each volume of the Session Laws (the Public Laws
before 1943). These versions are those in force at the beginning of that
particular session of the General Assembly.
"' N.C. CoNsT. art. V, § 3 (1868); Redmond v. Commissioners, 106
N.C. 122, 10 S.E. 845 (1890).
...
The statutory procedures for administration of the property tax were

known as the Machinery Act and were re-enacted each biennium until made
permanent in 1939. The Machinery Act is now codified as N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 105-271 to -398 (1965).
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able property in the state, real, personal and intangible, was listed
on local tax books at its true market value. On the basis of the
total valuation of all counties, the state levied its property tax, and
the counties theirs. But there were two problems: the constitutional
limit on the tax rate and the valuation process.
Through a peculiar equation of the property and poll taxes, the
constitution limited the combined total of the state and county tax
rates to sixty-six and two-thirds cents per one hundred dollars
value.149 Another section provided that the county tax rate could
never exceed twice the state rate.150 Thus, the maximum county
rate was forty-four and four-ninths cents, which would be reduced
pro tanto whenever the state rate exceeded twenty-two and twoninths cents. In this system the crucial decision soon came to be,
not the rate of tax to be levied, but how much to value each individual piece of real estate, item of personal property, or intangible
on the tax books.
Listing and evaluation of property was done locally. With expanded demand for schools and roads, by 1920 nearly all the counties
were levying their maximum rate, which was determined by what
the state rate was for that year. Tax relief was possible, therefore,
only in the form of lower values for property. This was simpler
for real estate and tangible personal property than for intangibles.'
Many local officials yielded to pressure for tax relief and systematically reduced real estate and personal property values below their
true market value. The effect of these horizontal reductions in value
for realty and personalty was to drive intangible property into
hiding. Shares of stock, promissory notes, cash, and similar items
of property were simply not on the tax lists and were paying neither
provided that the poll tax should be
1.. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1915)
equal to the tax on property valued at $300, but should never exceed $2.00.
rate which will yield $2.00 on property valued at $300 is 66 2/30.
The1 tax
0
1.

N.C. CONST. art. V, § 6 (1915).
There can be reasonable doubt as to the value of a tract of land or a

chattel, but no doubt as to the value of a certificate of stock traded on a
national exchange, a bank note, or commercial paper in general. Until 1936
the Constitution did not allow special treatment for intangible property; all
property had to be taxed by "uniform rule." While tax relief for intangibles
was attempted in the form of allowing of credits and deductions against the
tax, the effort to tax intangible property by the same rules as real estate
and personal property was not successful. From 1920 to 1937 the total
amount of intangible property listed in the State declined steadily. See generally, NORTH CAROLINA CLASSIFICATION AMENDMTENT COiMISSION, REPORT 47-55 (1938). N.C. CONST. art. V, § 3, now allows the General Assembly to classify property and prescribe uniform rules for each class.
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state nor local taxes even though intangible property was becoming
in fact the major evidence of wealth. A vicious circle had set in.
Real estate and tangible personal property were bearing an inequitable
share of the tax burden because of the flight of intangibles and were
being valued below market because of this, but intangibles were not
being listed because the lowered values placed on realty and tangible
personalty would have caused intangibles to bear an inequitable tax
burden. 5 '
The first major effort at reform came in 1913 from the same
study commission which recommended amendments restricting local
legislation. As proposed by the Constitutional Commission of 1913,
article V of the constitution would have been revised to allow the
separation of sources of revenue between the counties and the
state. 113 The state would have taxed intangible property to the exclusion of the counties, and the counties would have taxed realty and
tangible personalty to the exclusion of the state. But a limit of
sixty-six and two-thirds cents was still placed on the combined state
and local tax rates. The amendments failed at the polls.
The 1919 General Assembly tried once more.'54 Under the 1919
proposals the state would have been allowed to levy a general income tax which would allow it to abandon the property tax entirely
to the counties. Intangible property would have been exempt from
the property tax but income from intangible property would have
been taxed at a higher rate than other income. The total of state and
county ad valorem taxes would have been limited to sixty-six and
two-thirds cents with the expectation that all of this amount would
be available to the counties. At the same time, state-supervised revaluation of property undertook to get all realty listed at its true
market value, discover non-listed personalty and taxable polls, and
ferret out intangibles. 15
The state revaluation was so successful that the constitutional
amendments proposed by the 1919 General Assembly were never
submitted to the people. Revaluation had tripled the value of property listed for taxes in the state."5" A special session was called in
.5See generally, BETTERS, STATE CENTRALIZATION IN NORTH CAROLINA
26-31 (1932).

"' N.C. Pub. Laws Ex. Sess. 1913, ch. 81;

ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

REPORT OF [TE] ComISSION

(1913).

""4 N.C. Pub. Laws 1919, ch. 129.

S'N.C. Pub. Laws 1919, ch. 84.
BETTERS, STATE CENTRALIZATION IN NORTH CAROLINA

..

31 (1932).
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1920 to approve the revaluation. It did so and revised the 1920
revenue act to reflect the new tax base. 157 At the same time, the
proposed constitutional amendments enacted in 1919 were amended
to delete the special treatment for income tax on intangibles and to
reduce the maximum county tax rate from sixty-six and two-thirds
cents to fifteen cents.'
These amendments were submitted and
ratified by the people.
As envisioned by the 1920 amendments 8 9 and the 1919 state
revaluation act, the counties would have enjoyed sole access to the
property tax guaranteed by a state-supervised valuation process.
Valuation of all property at true market value would insure that the
tax base would be sufficient to meet local demand for services within
a maximum tax rate of fifteen cents. But the entire plan was wrecked
by the business recession of 1920-21. State revaluation broke down
completely. Most of the counties systematically reduced property
values, and the pre-1919 cycle set in again.16 The net effect
was to leave the counties worse off than they had been under
the old system, for now they were limited to a maximum rate of
fifteen cents rather than forty-four and four-ninths cents as previously.
Contemporaneously with its handling of art II, § 29, the supreme
court was moving on other fronts to alleviate some of the plight of
local government in financial matters. Article VII, § 7, of the constitution forbids local governments to contract debts or levy taxes
without a vote of the people, except for "necessary expenses." An
early case construing this section of the constitution adopted a restrictive interpretation of "necessary expenses" which did not include
the public schools. 1" The impact of this ruling on local finance was
considerable since the two usual methods of evading the constitutional limit on the tax rate were to finance capital improvements by
bonds and to provide current expenses by deficit spending secured by
bonds or notes. If schools were not a "necessary expense," either
of these methods used in relation to the school system would require
the approval of an absolute majority of all registered voters in the
""N.C. Pub. Laws Ex. Sess. 1920, ch. 1.
...
N.C. Pub. Laws Ex. Sess. 1920, ch. 93.
...N.C. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 3, 6 (1920). See generally, Coates &
Mitchell, Property and Poll Tax Limitations Under the North Carolina
Constitution,
Article 1, Sections 1 and 6, 18 N.C.L. REv. 275 (1940).
0
o BETTERS, STATE CENTRALIZATION IN NORTH CAROLINA 31-33 (1932).
...
Barksdale v. Commissioners, 93 N.C. 472 (1885).
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county or school district in a special referendum. 2 Even when it
was possible to muster a majority of those voting, it was quite
difficult to obtain an absolute majority of all registered voters. As a
result, the quality of the schools varied greatly from county to county, depending largely on the county's relative wealth and its ability
to finance all county activities within the constitutional tax limit.
Some relief was afforded by the court's reversal of position on
whether schools were a necessary expense. This was accomplished
by overruling its former decision and reconciling the taxation limitations of article V with the requirement of art. IX, § 3, that
Each county of the State shall be divided into a convenient number of districts, in which one or more public schools shall be
maintained at least six months in every year; and if the commissioners of any county shall fail to comply with the aforesaid requirements of this section, they shall be liable to indictment. 0 3
What could be done if the total revenue available upon levy of the
maximum constitutional rate was not sufficient to maintain a sixmonth school term with teachers paid a minimum salary prescribed by
the state? In Collie v. Commissioners'" the court held that art. IX,
§ 3, and art. V, § 6, construed together, allowed counties to exceed
the constitutional limit on local taxation to the extent necessary to
maintain a six-months school term but no further. Thus, all other
local activities had to be financed within the constitutional limit,
which after 1920 was fifteen cents. By that time it was rapidly
becoming impossible to satisfy local demand even under this liberalized rule.
In this labyrinthine constitutional structure the two alternatives
open to local governments unable to meet demand for roads and
schools within the constitutional limits were bond issues and special
taxes. The constitution allowed counties to exceed the tax limit "for
a special purpose, and with the special approval of the General Assembly."'

0 5

The General Assembly had long authorized the levy of special
.N.. .C. CONST. art. VII, § 7 (1915); Sprague v. Commissioners, 165
N.C. 603, 81 S.E. 915 (1914). This section was amended by N.C. Sess. Laws
1947, ch. 34, to allow approval by a majority of those voting.
...
N.C. CoNsT. art. IX, § 3 (1917). Before 1917 the required term was
four months.
-1 145 N.C. 170, 59 S.E. 44 (1907). The rule of Collie was written into
art. V,
0 § 6, by the 1920 amendments.
N.C. CONST. art. V, § 6 (1920).
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taxes for roads, courthouses, county homes and a few other expenses, but only to the extent of a five cent rate.'
Issuance of
bonds was subject to a statutory limitation that bonds could not be
issued in excess of five per cent of the assessed valuation of the
county.1 7 These limits were so low that many counties could not
make effective use of them. Rather than amend the general law to
liberalize the limits, a task which would have been difficult due to
the widely varying financial status of the 100 counties, the General
Assembly enacted hundreds of local acts authorizing bond issues in
excess of the five per cent limit, and special taxes in excess of the
five cent limit or for purposes not allowed by the general law.
In this context, then, the supreme court was being asked to invalidate local acts funding existing road debt, authorizing road
bonds, authorizing the levy of special taxes for road construction
and maintenance, and authorizing special taxes and bonds for
schools. If the court had adopted a broad construction of art. II,
§ 29, and prevented the General Assembly from enacting local legislation providing for the financing of roads and schools, one of two
things would have happened: either the General Assembly would
have been forced to re-examine state road and school policy, or
many counties would have been unable to provide these services at
the level demanded by their citizens. The court chose not to force
either result. Whatever may have been the merits of state policy,
it was firmly established that the financial arrangements to be made
for roads and schools were primarily of local concern." 8
B. The Era of Reappraisal: 1938-1961
1. The Reforms of 1931-33.-The General Assemblies of 1931
and 1933 revolutionized the relationship between the state and its
local governments. 0 9 The state began strict supervision of local government finance,170 assumed almost total responsibility for the highway system,17 1 and took over most of the operating cost of the public
. N.C. Pub. Laws 1923, ch. 7.
"87N.C.
Pub. Laws 1927, ch. 81, § 17.
..
See, e.g., N.C. CoMM'N ON COUNTY

GOVERNMENT, REPORT (1927);
McMahon, The North Carolina Local Government Commission, 1960 N.C.
Ass'N OF COUNTY CoMM'RS COUNTY YEARBOOx 93-97.
...
See generally, BETTERS, STATE CENTRALIZATION IN NORTH CAROLINA

(1932).
..
o N.C. Pub. Laws 1931, ch. 60, 99.
...
N.C.Pub. Laws 1933, ch. 172; N.C. Pub. Laws 1931, ch. 145.
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school system.'
The fiscal arrangements of the 1920's which had
cast almost the entire burden of maintaining roads and schools on
county government and the property tax were swept away. In their
place were prescribed state systems financed by an increased income
tax, 17 3 a sales tax 17' and a gasoline taxy
All special road districts 6 and all but a few of the special school districts were
abolished. 7 1 Only school capital outlay and local option supplementary funds for schools were to remain with county government.
Initially, it seemed as if these reforms had cut the ground from
under the supreme court's permissive attitude toward local legislation. Local legislation seemed no longer essential for adequate minimum financial support of roads and schools, and in fact bore a large
share of the blame for the near-bankrupt state of many of the
counties. Underlying these reforms was the basic policy that road,
school and debt policy for local government should be uniform
throughout the state. The old system had met public demand in a
piece-meal fashion and the sanguine hope of the reformers was that
state support and control would remedy inequities inherent in a system tying the financial support of the two major activities of state
government to geographic subdivisions bearing no logical relation
whatever to the distribution of wealth. But implicit in the principle
of state support is compromise. If there were wide disparities in
the ability of local governments to support roads and schools, there
were also wide disparties in the level of services demanded by the
citizenry. Any general state program, through the inevitable operation of the political process, would be offered at a level below that
demanded by some areas and above that otherwise possible or desired in others.
The supreme court was caught up in this major policy shift via
cases challenging local acts under art. II, § 29. Those involving
individual school districts immediately challenged the uniformity of
. ',N.C.Pub. Laws 1931, ch. 10, 371, 430 (state takes over 6 months
school term) ; 99, 100, 378 (regulating finances of existing school districts) ;
180, 186 (funding debt of existing school districts) ; N.C. Pub. Laws 1933,
ch. 143, 205, 257, 258, 299, 374, 376, 436, 500 (readjusting local government
debt); 562 (School Machinery Act of 1933).
..Revenue Act of 1931, § 310, N.C. Pub. Laws 1931, ch. 427.
""Emergency Revenue Act of 1933, §§ 400-27, N.C. Pub. Laws 1933, ch.
445. 75
N.C. Pub. Laws 1931, ch. 145, § 24.
""N.C. Pub. Laws 1931, ch. 145, § 7.
...
N.C. Pub. Laws 1933, ch. 562, § 4.
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the school system. The 1931-33 school reform acts had provided
for variation in local demand through locally approved supplementary school taxes, but only at the county level. It was soon to become apparent that in many areas of the state variations in demand
within the county were too great to be satisfied effectively within
the framework of the general laws. To a minority of the court, any
local modification of the general school laws was not favored. To
the majority, the policy of uniformity was subsidiary to the general
policy of state-local cooperation in providing for public education.
This conflict on the court was to cause a re-examination and modification of its attitude toward art. II, § 29. However, the first indication of a change in position of the court came not in a case involving
local finance, but one concerning the regulation of trade. Before
turning to the school district cases of 1939-40, close attention to
State v. Dixon 78 is necessary.
In 1937 the General Assembly attempted to regulate real estate
brokers through an occupational licensing board. 7 9 Although originally intended to be state-wide in application, the act was amended
during its course through the General Assembly to exempt sixtyfour of the one hundred counties. Dixon was convicted of practicing the profession of real estate brokerage without a license. Upon
return of a verdict of guilty, he moved in arrest of judgment on
grounds that the licensing act was unconstitutional as an act "regulating labor, trade, mining or manufacturing." The trial judge
allowed his motion and the state appealed. The supreme court affirmed in a four to three decision with three separate opinions.
Three justices concurred in the opinion of the court, Justice Barnhill
concurred in the affirmance for different reasons, and three justices
dissented. The three opinions reveal the court's uncertainty and dissatisfaction with its own precedents construing art. II, § 29, and its
unwillingness to go outside them to the well-developed body of case
law construing similar constitutional provisions in other states.
Justice Clarkson for the court condemned the licensing act on
two grounds: it violated art. II, § 29, as a regulation of trade, and
was in derogation of the Revenue Act, a state policy of general ap-178 215 N.C. 161, 1 S.E.2d 521 (1939).
...
N.C. Pub. Laws 1937, ch. 292. An earlier act on the same subject
had been declared unconstitutional in State v. Warren, 211 N.C. 75, 189
S.E. 108 (1937).
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plication."' In his discussion of the act's conformity to the requirements of art. II, § 29, Justice Clarkson was on relatively firm
ground. There can be little argument with his conclusion that the
act regulated trade within the meaning of the constitution. Nor can
there be serious criticism of his conclusion that the rule of In re Harris'-" held the act to be local since it applied to less than one-half of
the counties. Had he gone no further, the opinion would have contributed little to the law beyond the characterization of occupational
licensing as a regulation of trade. But Justice Clarkson also seemed
anxious to demonstrate that the act was invalid on non-constitutional grounds.
For many years the state had levied a privilege license tax on
real estate brokers under the Revenue Act.182 This was purely a
revenue-raising device, not intended to regulate the manner in which
the trade was carried on. Yet Justice Clarkson concluded that
the issuance of a privilege license to the defendant Dixon, which
was nothing more than evidence that he had paid the required tax,
amounted to a legislative determination that he should be allowed
to engage in his profession throughout the length and breadth of
the state. The occupational licensing act under attack, on the other
hand, purported to lay down different standards for determining
whether Dixon should be allowed to engage in his profession in
thirty-six counties. By applying the rule that a local act in conflict
with or derogation of a general law is invalid, the occupational
licensing act was declared repealed by the general law. Justice Clarkson expressed the rule as follows:
Whenever the General Assembly has, by a general act of Statewide application, adopted a specific licensing policy to be applied
uniformly throughout the State with respect to a particular occupation, a local act in derogation of the general act must fail. The
reason for this rule is apparent; all acts of the same session of the
General Assembly on the same subject are to be considered as one
act.., and effect given to all provisions if this can be done upon
any fair hypothesis ... with the use of all reasonable means to
but subordinate aims where
arrive at the legislative intent ....

inconsistent must yield to primary intent and local wishes must
yield to general, State-wide policies.'8 3
.80
A real estate brokers' licensing act was not re-enacted until 1957.
N.C.81GEN.
STAT. ch. 93A. (1965).
183 N.C. 633, 112 S.E. 425 (1922).
""' Now codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-41 (1965).
183 215 N.C. at 167, 1 S.E.2d at 524.
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This doctrine is a rather peculiar twist to the traditional maxim
that statutes are to be construed in pari materia s4 It runs counter
to the general rule in North Carolina that general laws do not repeal
special acts by implication."8 5 While Justice Clarkson's second
ground for invalidating the 1937 real estate brokers licensing act
might be questionable law, it reflects a judicial policy which was to
become a major factor in the court's subsequent attitude toward
local legislation: where the state adopts a state-wide policy in regard
to a given subject, local acts in conflict with that policy will not be
favored by the court.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Devin s8 would probably have
had little impact on subsequent developments were it not for his
classification arguments. After disagreeing with the majority as to
the application of the rule of In re Harris,Justice Devin proceeded
to cite abundant authority to the effect that a "public law of general
obligation" need not be uniformly applicable throughout the territorial extent of the state. It need only "apply equally to all persons
within the territorial limits described in the act."' 7 Justice Devin's
authorities and reasoning would have been appropriate had the case
challenged the act under the equal protection clause of the United
States Constitution.. s or the "law of the land" clause8 . of the North
Carolina Constitution, but they have no place in the construction of
art. II, § 29, as was pointed out by the concurring opinion of Justice
Barnhill.
"'See 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5202 (3d ed. Horack
1943).
18 E.g., Duke Power Co. v. Bowles, 229 N.C. 143, 48 S.E.2d 287 (1948);
Hammond v. City of Charlotte, 205 N.C. 469, 171 S.E. 612 (1933) ; Monteith
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 195 N.C. 71, 141 S.E. 481 (1928); State v.
Johnson, 170 N.C. 685, 86 S.E. 788 (1915); McRae v. Wessell, 28 N.C.
153 (1845). Accord, 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5204 (3d
ed. Horack 1943).
180 215 N.C. at 173, 1 S.E.2d at 527.
187 Id. at 176-77, 1 S.E.2d at 530.
188 This has long been the rule with respect to the effect of U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV on local legislation. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427
(1961); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 551 (1954); Fort Smith Light
& Traction Co. v. Board of Improvement, 274 U.S. 387, 391 (1927);
Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914); Mallett v. North Carolina,
181 U.S. 589 (1901); Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1879).
18 N.C. CONST. art. I, § 17: "No person ought to be taken, imprisoned,
or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed or exiled, or
in any manner deprive of his life, liberty or property, but by the law of the
land." The North Carolina Supreme Court generally holds that this section
is equivalent to the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
See, e.g., Eason v. Spence, 232 N.C. 579, 61 S.E.2d 717 (1950).
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Justice Barnhill's opinion"9" shed the first ray of light on the
dark convolutions of the North Carolina case law construing art. II,
§ 29. He agreed that the real estate licensing act of 1937 regulated
trade, but sought to point out the court's confusion by offering a
distinction between the concept of a "local" law and a "special" law.
Whatever may be the merits of attempting to distinguish among
public, local, private, or special acts, Barnhill's was the first sensible
effort of the North Carolina Supreme Court to rationalize art. II,
§ 29. The term "special law," he wrote, "means laws imposing
particular burdens or conferring special rights, privileges or immunities upon a portion of the people of the State without including
therein and being applicable to all of the class throughout the
State."'0 1 This, of course, is familiar learning under the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. A "local" law on the
other hand, is one which does not apply uniformly throughout the
territory of the state to the same class of persons subject to it but
only to those of that class within the geographical limits of its application. Justice Barnhill continued:
Thus, it appears that the purpose of the act is to regulate the
trade of real estate brokers and salesmen, and that the legislature
grouped the real estate brokers of the State as a whole into a
class sufficiently distinguished by characteristics to make it the
subject of legislation. However, notwithstanding the declared intent of the Legislature to deal with real estate brokers and salesmen as a class throughout the State, the act by sec. 17 1/2 exempts from the operation thereof 64 counties. It appears,
therefore, that the act does not apply to real estate brokers and
salesmen throughout the State as a class, notwithstanding the
declared purpose of the Legislature. The lawmaking body made
a reasonable classification of citizens and then, by the express
terms of the act, excluded from its operation a large portion of
the class. To my mind, this alone stamps the legislation as speof Art. II, sec. 29,
cial, brings it within the prohibitive provisions
92
of the Constitution, and makes it invalid.1
Even Justice Barnhill's opinion is less than lucid. Having identified the proper concept for dealing with local legislation, he failed
to keep it separate from the equal protection clause. But despite its
limitations, State v. Dixon was to become the watershed of local
legislation cases in North Carolina, with Justice Barnhill's concur190215 N.C. at 171, 1 S.E.2d at 526.
91
1 Id. at 171, 1 S.E.2d at 527.
19 Id. at 172, 1 S.E.2d at 527.
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ring opinion eventually to become the rule of the court. Meanwhile,
the court remained sorely divided on the proper scope to be allowed
to art. II, § 29, as would be abundantly clear in the school district
cases decided in 1939 and 1940.
2. The School District Cases.-The 1933 School Machinery
Act 9 3 provided that school capital outlay was to be undertaken by
local administrative units and financed by taxes levied throughout
the unit. The system of special districts which characterized local
school programs in the 1920's was abolished.' Yet it soon became
apparent that support for capital improvements in many units could
not be mustered throughout the unit. Many school districts had
constructed their buildings in the recent past by special district taxes
and were still paying off the bonds. The residents of these areas
did not look with favor on the prospect of having to assist in the
construction of schools for other areas within the county which had
not been quite so progressive as they in the past. As a result countywide taxes could not be voted in many counties for the construction
of any new buildings.' 95 Local acts began to be enacted in 1937 to
remedy the problem. Under these acts the county board of commissioners would be authorized to establish special taxing districts for
school purposes upon petition, and to authorize bond elections within these districts for the construction of school buildings. 9 The
first test of such an act to reach the supreme court was Hinson v.
Board of Comi'rs1 7 The plaintiffs in Hinson alleged that the
local act under which the Yadkin County commissioners had established the Jonesville school district' violated the school clause of
art. II, § 29. The trial judge, Sam J. Ervin, Jr., later to become an
associate justice of the supreme court, agreed with the plaintiffs and
enjoined the bond issue.' 99 This injunction was affirmed by an
equally divided court without opinion. At the next term the issue
came up again, this time from Buncombe County, in Fletcher v.
Board of County Comm'rs 0 0
N.C. Pub. Laws 1933, ch. 562.
...
...
N.C. Pub. Laws 1933, ch. 562, § 4.
10r See Fletcher v. Board of County Comm'rs, 218 N.C. 1, 9 S.E.2d 606
(1940).
E.g., N.C. Pub.-Loc. Laws 1937, ch. 220.
107216 N.C. 806, 6 S.E.2d 504 (1940).
"' N.C. Pub.-Loc. Laws 1939, ch. 525.
Record, Hinson v. Board of Comm'rs, 216 N.C. 806, 6 S.E.2d 504
...
(1940).
200 218 N.C. 1, 9 S.E.2d 606 (1940).
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The local act challenged in Fletcher was similar to the Yadkin
County act invalidated by Hinson.'" While Hinson did not show
the alignment of the court, Fletcher supports the conclusion that
Chief Justice Stacy, who was not sitting when Hinson was decided,
cast the decisive vote. Justice Seawell wrote the opinion for the
court and upheld the Buncombe County act. Justice Barnhill dissented, joined by Justices Devin and Winborne. In a well-written
opinion, Justice Seawell brought the school special tax districts under
the rule of Reed v. Howerton Eng'r Co. 2 without citing that case.
It will be observed that the act in question prescribes a method whereby school districts or special bond tax units may be
uniformly established throughout the county. The act itself deals
only with the mechanics of establishing or changing the lines of
school districts or special bond tax units, and does not, ex proprio
vigore, undertake to establish or change any such lines. These
are matters which, in terms, are committed to the sound discretion of the county board of education. The constitutional prohibition as respects the matter now in hand is against direct
action on the part of the General Assembly and not against the
establishment of machinery for the accomplishment of these
2 03
ends.
Seawell then turned to a refutation of the state policy rationale
urged by Justice Devin in State v. Dixon. He pointed out that
Questions of policy derived solely from statutes can be of
little avail in determining the priority or potency of separate
statutes upon the same subject where there is a suggested conflict.
Certainly the same power which creates a policy may destroy it,
or modify it, or make exceptions, or do with it as it will; and
frequently the stronger indication of policy lies in the exception
20 4
rather than in the rule.
In addition, he noted that the interpretive rule urged by Devin in
Dixton was contrary to the normal rule applied by the court.20 5 However, Seawell was not blind to the policy implications of his decision.
Rather, it appears that these were uppermost in his mind. The
opinion concludes with these words:
It has been said that the policy of the State is epitomized in
the expression, 'An equal educational opportunity for every boy
1
N.C. Pub.-Loc. Laws 1937, ch. 279.
202188 N.C. 39, 123 S.E. 479 (1924).
203 218 N.C. at 5, 9 S.E.2d at 609 (1940).
20
Id. at 6, 9 S.E.2d at 609.
205 Id. at 6-7, 9 S.E.2d at 610.
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and girl in the State.' Equality in educational opportunity must
not be achieved by a leveling down process....
When the State took over the maintenance of the public
schools, it did not take over the business of building schoolhouses. The law simply abolished all taxing districts, including
special charter districts, to which the great advance in the building program had been largely due .... There are one hundred
counties in the State, each with its own difficulties and problems,
some of which seem to be almost unsolvable. There are one hundred governing boards, composed of men who have widely different ideas upon this subject and with a discretion which may be
exercised and reflected in widely divergent standards throughout the State. Under such conditions the recognition of com-6
20
munity initiative seems to be as imperative as it has ever been.
Justice Barnhill's opinion20 7 for the dissenters confused the
statutory construction arguments of Justice Devin in Dixon with
the majority's constitutional arguments and exalted them into a
rule of constitutional law. This novel doctrine has not been perpetuated in any subsequent opinion.
On the same day, the court took up Hinson v. Commissioners0 8
on rehearing and reversed Judge Ervin's decision below on authority
of Fletcher. Justice Barnhill again dissented20 9 on the basis of his
dissent in Fletcher,but with the added observation that he no longer
considered Brown v. Commissioners210 authoritative. "At the time
that decision was rendered," Barnhill noted, "the State had not assumed control of the State Highways or the maintenance of county
roads. The Act under consideration in that case was not in conflict
with any State policy.... 2 1 1
The school district cases of 1939-40 made no immediate change
in the case law construing art. II, § 29, but they showed that three
of the seven justices were quite willing to scrap all of their former
precedents, at least insofar as local school acts were concerned. Even
the majority was concerned to justify their decision at some length.
The court had come around from its former position by ninety
degrees, a harbinger of later developments.
3. The Health Cases.-The broad constructionists were not able
200
Id. at 7, 9 S.E.2d at 610.
7
20
Id.at 7, 9 S.E.2d at 610.
208218 N.C. 13, 9 S.E.2d 614 (1940).
200
Id. at 14, 9 S.E.2d at 615.
173 N.C. 598, 92 S.E. 502 (1917).
212218 N.C. at 15, 9 S.E.2d at 615.

19671

LOCAL LEGISLATION

to win a majority of the court in the school district cases, but they
reigned supreme in a new class of cases being brought to the court
invoking the hitherto neglected clause of art. II,§ 29, "relating to
health, sanitation and the abatement of nuisances." Without the
deadening weight of outmoded precedent, and confronted with subject matter of much less popular concern, the court invalidated every
local act brought before it which remotely involved health matters.
The first two cases concerned local acts relating to county boards
of health. In Sams v. Board of County Comm'rs.2 . the plaintiff
sued to recover his salary as county physician. He had been appointed by a county board of health organized under a local act. In
a short opinion limited to declaratory statements the court held the
local act void. "It is apparent that the act is local and that it relates
to health and sanitation ....
Board of Health v. Board of Comm'rs14 invalidated a local act
requiring that the appointment by a local board of health of a county health officer be confirmed by the county commissioners. After
summarily holding that the act was local and related to health, Justice Seawell introduced a new version of the legislative intent underlying art. II, § 29, to replace the statutory contruction doctrines
advocated by Justice Devin in State v. Dixon. Seawell stated that
We have become increasingly conscious of the fact that many
of the problems which heretofore we have considered purely local
are so related to the welfare of the whole state as to demand
uniform and coordinated action under general laws. We believe
that the section of the Constitution which the plaintiffs have invoked was not intended merely as a device to free the Legislature
from the enormous amount of petty detail that had theretofore
occupied every session, but we think it was also framed upon the
principle that we have just stated, and therefore it should not be
so construed as to minimize the provision it has made looking to
this result. Itis remedial in nature, and its application should
not be denied on an unsubstantial distinction which would defeat
its purpose. It especially mentions general laws 'relating to
health' as being within its protective purview, recognizing that
the alleviation of suffering and disease, the eradication or reduction of communicable disease in its humanitarian, social, and eco212
1

217 N.C. 284, 7 S.E.2d 540 (1940).
Id. at 285, 7 S.E.2d at 541. Justice Devin, writing for the majority,

still held to his uniform state policy rationale for art. II,
§ 29, first advanced
in State v. Dixon.

" 220 N.C. 140, 16 S.E.2d 677 (1941).
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nomic aspect, is a State-wide problem which ought not to be
interfered with by local dilatory laws which are so frequently
the outcome of local indifferency, or factional and political dis215
agreements.
This conception of art. II, § 29, as a directive for general laws
rather than a time-saver for the legislature, was further elaborated
by Justice Ervin in Idol v. Street."" This case sought a declaratory
judgment that an ordinance of the city-county board of health for
Forsyth County and Winston-Salem which sought to regulate the
sale of milk within its jurisdiction was invalid on grounds that the
board of health had been organized under a local act in contravention of art. II, § 29. The court held the act invalid. After paying
his respects to the traditional rationale that art. II, § 29, was designed solely to conserve legislative time, Justice Ervin attributed
quite a different intent to the amendment.
In thus amending their organic law, the people were motivated by the desire that the General Assembly should legislate
for North Carolina in respect to the subjects specified as a single
united commonwealth rather than as a conglomeration of innumerable discordant communities. To prevent this laudable desire from degenerating into a mere pious hope, they decreed in
emphatic and express terms that 'any local, private, or special act
or resolution passed in violation of the provisions of this section
shall be void,' no matter how praise-worthy or wise such local,
217
private, or special act or resolution may be.
The extent to which the court had changed directions comes out
strikingly in two cases involving financial matters-the type of case
which had been the model for judicial restraint in the 1920's. Lamb
v. Board of Educ.2 18 invalidated an act which had forbidden a local
board of education from spending "in excess of $2,000 under any
one project or contract for the purpose of extending any public or
private water or sewer system so that such extended system will
serve any public school" 219 in the county. The court held the act
related to health "since its sole purpose is to prescribe provisions
with respect to sewer and water service.... ,2o In fact, the act was
...
Id. at 143, 16 S.E.2d at 679.
210233 N.C. 730, 65 S.E.2d 313 (1951).
Id. at 732-33, 65 S.E.2d at 315.
218 235 N.C. 377, 70 S.E.2d 201 (1952).
...
N.C. Sess. Laws 1951, ch. 1075.
220
235 N.C. at 379, 70 S.E.2d at 203.
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probably one more example of the use of local legislation to transfer
local political disputes to Raleigh and had only minimal connections
with health matters.
Board of Managers v. City of Wilmington2 2 ' had more significant implications. This case held void a local act authorizing contracts between a city, the county, and the local hospital for hospitalization of the "indigent sick and afflicted poor," an arrangement
not adequately provided for by general law. While the court discussed a great many old cases construing art. II, § 29, resurrecting
many of them for the first time in years, it added little to the body
of the law beyond an illustration of the court's willingness to upset
local financial arrangements established by local act.
4. Streets and Courts.-Only one innovation was introduced into the cases construing the street clause of art. II, § 29, in the
period between 1935 and 1961. Carolina-VirginiaCoastal Highway
v. Coastal Turnpike Authority2

2

involved the act of the 1949 Gen-

eral Assembly authorizing the creation of a corporation for the
purpose of building toll roads and toll bridges in five named coastal
counties. 2s The act was held invalid primarily on grounds other
than art. II, § 29, but the court expressed the opinion that it came
within the rule of In re Harris224 and related to streets, ferries and
bridges. Significantly, the act did not purport to locate any specific
highway but merely set up the administrative apparatus for doing
so. The holding is therefore at odds with the court's previous decisions in street cases.2 25
In other cases the court reaffirmed its earlier ruling that an act
increasing the jurisdiction of a local court did not violate art. II,
§ 29,226 upheld an act increasing the authority of a city chartered
before 1917 to levy street assessments ;227 and held that neither the
establishment of a claims docket in a local court 228 nor an act au2-237 N.C. 179, 74 S.E.2d 749 (1953).
2- 237 N.C. 52, 74 S.E.2d 310 (1953).

N.C. Sess. Laws 1949, ch. 1024, as amended, N.C. Sess. Laws 1951,
ch. 2'993.183 N.C. 633, 112 S.E. 425 (1922).
223

.2See note 101 supra and accompanying text.
.2State v. Norman, 237 N.C. 205, 74 S.E.2d 602 (1953); Williams v.
Cooper, 222 N.C. 589, 24 S.E.2d 484 (1943).
""City of Goldsboro v. Atlantic Coast Line RR., 241 N.C. 216, 85
S.E.2d 125 (1954). See also, In re Resolutions, 243 N.C. 494, 91 S.E.2d
171 (1956).
...
Better Home Furniture Co. v. Baron, 243 N.C. 502, 91 S.E.2d 236
(1956).
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thorizing police to issue warrants 229 amounted to the "establishment"
of a court. 230
C. The Era of Broad Construction: McIntyre v. Clarkson (1961).
In 1949 the General Assembly enacted an alternative method for
selecting justices of the peace.2' Under this act, the boards of
county commissioners were authorized to fix by resolution the number of justices of the peace to be appointed for their counties, to fix
the salaries of the justices, and to define their jurisdiction. Upon
adoption of such a resolution, the resident judge of the superior
court was to appoint the requisite number of justices of the peace.
The Mecklenburg County board of commissioners elected to use
this new procedure, adopted the necessary resolution, and appropriated funds for payments of the justices' salaries. The plaintiff in
McIntyre v. Clarkson 3 2 brought a taxpayer's suit to enjoin the
resident superior court judge from appointing justices of the peace
under the 1949 act and to restrain the county commissioners from
paying their salaries from public funds. The basis of the suit was
that the 1949 act applied to only twenty-eight counties 3 and was
therefore a local act "relating to the appointment of justices of the
peace," void under art. II, § 29.
The supreme court could have easily declared the Justice of the
Peace Act of 1949 void under the rule of In re Harris,since not
even a near-majority of the state's 100 counties were subject to the
act. The court did not choose to do so but held the act unconstitu," State v. St. Clair, 246 N.C. 183, 97 S.E.2d 840 (1957).
280 See also, State v. Ballenger, 247 N.C. 216, 100 S.E.2d 351 (1957).
In this case the court considered whether the addition or deletion of a county

from the list of counties exempted from a general law valid under the rule
of In re Harris (applicable to more than one-half of the 100 counties)
amounted to the passage of an act applicable to the added or deleted county
alone and thus violated art. II, § 29. The court held that addition or deletion
of a single county amounts to a re-enactment of the entire act, thus invoking
the rule of It re Harris and saving the validity of the act. Id. at 217-18, 100
S.E.2d at 353. This holding seems to ignore the clause of art. III, § 29,
concerning enactment of local acts by the "partial repeal" of a general law.
...
N.C. Sess. Laws 1949, ch. 1091; N.C. GEL. STAT. §§ 7-120.1 to -120.11
(1953). Under the usual procedure justices of the peace are appointed by the
General Assembly and receive only fees as compensation. There are numerous local modifications, all of which will be rendered obsolete by the Court
Reform Act of 1965 under N.C. CONST. art. IV.
282254 N.C. 510, 119 S.E.2d 888 (1961).
2.N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7-120.10 (1953).
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tional under art. II, § 29, for an entirely different reason. The court
held that
Within the meaning of constitutional prohibitions against local
laws, a law is local where, by force of an inherent limitation, it
arbitrarily separates some places from others upon which, but for
such limitation, it would operate, where it embraces less than
the entire class of places to which such legislation would be necessary or appropriate having regard to the purpose for which the
legislation was designed, and where the classification does not
rest on circumstances distinguishing the places included from
those excluded.2 4
Under this test the number of local units included or excluded from
the operation of an act is immaterial. Rather, the test is whether
any rational basis reasonably related to the objective of the legislation can be identified which justifies the separation of units of local
government into included and excluded categories. Thus, it is possible that an act applying to ninety-nine out of the one hundred counties might be held a "local" act while another applying to only one
county might be "general."
The reasonable classification test of McIntyre v. Clarkson was
an innovation in the law of North Carolina but has long been the
rule in nearly all the states having constitutional prohibitions against
the enactment of local, special or private legislation. m5 Discussion
of the case law on classification from other jurisdictions is abundant
elsewhere and need not be repeated here. In barest outline, a statutory classification is held to be "reasonable" if it satisfies the following five tests: (1) the classification must be based upon substantial
distinctions which make one class really different from another; (2)
the classification adopted must be germane to the purpose of the
law; (3) the classification must not be based upon existing circum234254 N.C. at 518, 119 S.E.2d at 893-94. The court quoted this passage
from 50 Am. JUR. Statutes § 8 (1944).

"'See, e.g.,

SUTHERLAND,

§ 2.12 (1966); 2
§§ 2102-09 (3d ed.

ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW

STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Horack 1943); Binney, Restrictions Upon Local and Special Legislation in

the United States, 48 Am. L. REGISTER 613, 721, 816, 922, 1019, 1109 (1893) ;
Cloe & Marcus, Special and Local Legislation, 24 Ky. L.J. 351 (1936);
Horack & Welsh, Special Legislation: Anwther Twilight Zone, 12 IND. L.J.
109, 183 (1936-37); Hubbard, Special Legislation for Municipalities, 18
HARv. L. REv. 588 (1905); Winters, Classification of Municipalities, 57 Nw.
U.L. REv. 279 (1962). The case law on classification is so vast and so old it
is surprising that it took the court over forty years to discover it.
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stances only; (4) to whatever class a law may apply, it must apply
equally to each member thereof ;2s6 and (5) if the classification meets
these requirements, the number of members in a class is wholly
immaterial.2 7
McIntyre v. Clarkson, though a complete departure from the
court's prior rulings on whether a given act is local or general, did
not expressly overrule any of the North Carolina precedents. Instead, Justice Moore for the majority went to some length to develop
a rationale for the "apparent inconsistencies" in these cases. The
reasonable classification test adopted in McIntyre was justified as the
actual basis for decision in In re Harris"8 and much reliance was
placed on Justice Barnhill's concurring opinion in State v. Dixon.3
The great majority of the former decisions, those involving the
road and school district acts, were adroitly explained as being acts
"supplementary" to general laws.
In those situations in which the county is the established and
designated unit for the administration of a general, statewide law
or policy, a statute, having application to one or more counties,
which merely supplements the general law or policy, or aids in
the administration according to local needs, or is primarily designed to finance the operation, is not unconstitutional if it does
not directly or specifically violate a constitutional prohibition
against local, private or special legislation; and this is true even
if the statute incidentally or indirectly relates to the prohibited
2 40
subject.
...
At first glance this requirement seems to be merely a restatement of
the normal requirements of U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. However, the fourteenth amendment is held to apply only to persons as such and not to political
subdivisions. Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 551 (1954) and authorities cited note 188 supra. The requirement that all members of a class of
local governments must be treated equally does not spring from the fourteenth amendment but is properly an independent criterion of constitutional
provisions requiring the enactment of general laws on specified subjects.
"' Winters, Classification of Municipalities, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 279, 287

(1962).

-38 254 N.C. at 520, 119 S.E.2d at 895. The court said that the basis of
classification of the Recorder's Court Act of 1919 was "need."
..See note 190 supra and accompanying text. The court found that the
majority opinion in State v. Dixon "does not discuss classification, but the
general tenor of the opinion is consistent with that principle stated in the
concurring opinion." 254 N.C. at 521, 119 S.E.2d at 896.
2'0 254 N.C. at 522, 119 S.E.2d at 896. The court added, "Most of the
cases relating to roads and bridges arose during the period when roads and
bridges were, for the most part, the responsibility of the counties and the

counties were the units for administration purposes." Ibid.
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This statement cannot be taken as having much force outside the
context of road and school matters for it describes virtually all local
legislation relating to counties. It would be difficult to imagine a
local act regulating the affairs of any county, city, or other political
subdivision of the state which would be unrelated to any statewide
law or policy and did not in some manner supplement or aid in the
administration of that law or policy.2 4' Nevertheless, this rationale
neatly ties up the cases decided in the court's strict construction era
and allows the court to follow these precedents, now long established.2"
1. Regulation of Trade.-The clause of art. II, § 29, prohibiting
local acts "regulating labor, trade, mining or manufacturing," first
construed in State v. Dixon, began to assume major importance in
the supreme court in the late 1950's. Two cases, preceding McIntyre,
involved the prohibition and regulation of stock car racing. State v.
Chestnutt243 upheld a local act making it unlawful "for any person
...

to engage in, promote, or in anywise participate in any motor-

cycle or other motor vehicle race or races on Sunday in Wake County,
North Carolina.

'244

By the paper thin distinction that the statute

did not affirmatively disclose an intent to regulate commercial motor
vehicle racing, the court found no intent to regulate trade. Orange
Speedway, Inc. v. Clayton,241 on the other hand, required all persons
promoting or participating in motor vehicle racing in Orange County to purchase public liability insurance in stated amounts. 246 Even

though this local act nowhere indicated that it was directed toward
commercial activities, the court thought "it would seem to be unreasonable to suppose that any person, firm or corporation would
cc In fact, the court's standard definition of counties is that they are
"simply agencies of the State, constituted for the convenience of local administration in certain portions of the state's territory," Martin v. Board of
Comm'rs, 208 N.C. 354, 365, 180 S.E. 777, 783 (1935). In another place
the court has stated that "all the powers and functions of a county bear
reference to the general policy of the state, and are in fact an integral portion
of the general administration of state policy." O'Berry v. Mecklenburg
County, 198 N.C. 357, 360, 151 S.E. 880, 882 (1930). See LEwis, AN
INTRODUCTION TO COUNTY GOVERNMENT 4-9 (1963).
...
See Peacock v. County of Scotland, 262 N.C. 199, 136 S.E.2d 612
(1964). This case, decided three years after McIntyre, upheld a local act
providing for an election on the merger of two local school administrative
units. The court cited its old school district precedents but not McIntyre.
2'2241 N.C. 401, 85 S.E.2d 297 (1955).
""N.C.Sess. Laws 1949, ch. 177.
25 247 N.C. 528, 101 S.E.2d 406 (1958).
"'N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 588.
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construct and mantain a race track in Orange County and procure
the insurance coverage required . . . unless such person, firm or
corporation was engaged in the business of racing for profit. 2' 4T
Following closely on McIntyre were two major cases involving
Sunday-closing laws: Treasure City v. Clark248 and High Point
Surplus Co. v. Pleasant. 249 The act of the 1961 General Assembly which made it a misdemeanor to sell certain merchandise and services on Sunday" 0 was declared unconstitutionally vague by the
supreme court in 1962.251 Responding to the court's objection of
vagueness and also to a suggestion that the statute might violate art.
IT, § 29, because it exempted several counties,2 52 the 1963 General
Assembly rewrote the act. 3 The revised statute specifically exempted by name several counties and portions of others. It then
recited that "the areas that are exempted from this act . . . are so
exempted upon the classification of such areas as resort or tourist
254
areas ....
Treasure City v. Clark255 reaffirmed the classification
test of McIntyre and concluded that the 1963 revision did not meet
the test. The list of merchandise prohibited for sale on Sunday
did not include the kinds of goods and services normally sought by
tourists but rather those of primary interest to permanent residents.
Nor did the act include all of the state's well known resort areas.
The court found the legislative classification to be a sham and
held the act void under art. II, § 29. High Point Surplus Co. v.
Pleasants250 construed General Statute 153-9(55) which differs
from the act construed by Treasure City in that it authorizes the
21 247 N.C. at 532-33, 101 S.E.2d at 409. In State v. Smith, 265 N.C.
173, 143 S.E.2d 293 (1965). Justice Sharp reconciled these two cases with
the "incidental purpose" doctrine. State v. Chestnutt was explained as holding that that statute there challenged regulated all motor vehicle racing on
Sundays, not just commercial races. N.C. GuN. STAT. § 20-141.3 (Supp.
1965), which prescribes heavy penalties for motor vehicle racing on streets
and highways, was enacted in 1955, subsequent to the local act under consideration in State v. Chestnutt.
248 261 N.C. 130, 134 S.E.2d 97 (1964).
24. 264 N.C. 650, 142 S.E.2d 697 (1965).
220 N.C. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 1156.
25 GI Surplus Store, Inc. v. Hunter, 257 N.C. 206, 125 S.E.2d 764

(1962).id. at 211, 125 S.E.2d at 768.
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-346.2 (Supp. 1965).

...
N.C. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 488. The quoted language and exemptions
were not codified by the Revisor of Statutes, but are noted in an annotation
to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-346.2 (Supp. 1965).
5 261 N.C. 130, 134 S.E.2d 97 (1964).
22 264 N.C. 650, 142 S.E.2d 697 (1965).
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board of county commissioners to make Sunday sales of certain
1 7 This statute, which exempted
merchandise and services unlawful.25
forty-eight counties from its provisions, 25 made no attempt to define the criteria by which the General Assembly had determined
which counties should be included and which excluded. Nevertheless, the court sought to discover some common characteristic shared
by the included counties which could sustain the statute under the
reasonable classification test by McIntyre. Finding none, the court
held the statute void under art. II, § 29, since "it is clear that the
General Assembly did not intend that the statute have uniform statewide application to all similarly situated and conditioned in relation
259
to the purposes of the law.J
The most recent case, State v. Smith,26° invalidated a local act

authorizing the Forsyth County commissioners to regulate the closing hours of any "club" located within 300 feet of church or school
property.
2. Health Matters.-Before 1961 only cities of 5,000 or more
population could create housing authorities under the Housing
Authorities Law of 1935.61 In 1959 the act was amended to pro-

vide that in fourteen named counties, any city or town of a population of 500 or more might proceed under its authority. 22 The town
of Murphy took advantage of the 1959 amendment and created a
housing authority. The plaintiff in State er rel. Carringerv. Alverson2 63 sought a declaratory judgment that the 1959 amendment was
in violation of art. II, § 29, and that therefore Murphy's action in
creating a housing authority was void.
The court stated that the Housing Authorities Law was within
the health clause of art. II, § 29, since "G.S. 157-2 declares the pur...
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-9(55) (Supp. 1965) is a general grant of
ordinance making power to boards of county commissioners. State v. Smith,
265 N.C. 173, 143 S.E.2d 293 (1965) made dear that the court held invalid

only that portion of the statute authorizing the enactment of blue law ordinances.
"' Itnow exempts forty-four counties. Four separate amendments in
1965 deleted four counties from the list of exempted counties. N.C. Sess.
Laws 264
1965,N.C.
ch, at
388,657,
567,
1158.
1421083,
S.E.2d
at 703.
260265 N.C. 173, 143
2o1N.C. Sess. Laws

S.E.2d 293 (1965).

1935, ch. 456, as amended, N.C. Sess. Laws 1938

Ex. 6Sess. ch. 2, § 14.
. N.C. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 321. The act was amended in 1961 to make
the population requirement of 500 generally applicable throughout the state.
N.C.280254
GEN. STAT. § 157-3(3) (1964).
N.C. 204, 118 S.E.2d 408 (1961).
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pose to be the removal of conditions which 'cause an increase in and
spread of disease and crime and constitute a menace to health, safety, morals and welfare of the citizens ... .' ,," But the court de-

clined to hold whether the 1959 amendment met the test of Mclnt.yre
v. Clarkson and dismissed the plaintiff's suit for failure to allege
that public funds had been or were about to be spent, that taxes had
been levied or debts incurred, or that his rights had in any way been
infringed. Carringeris therefore chiefly remarkable for the lengths
to which it went to bring an act within the ambit of art. II, § 29.
The recital of legislative intent in the Housing Authorities Law is
standard boiler plate language used to invoke the exercise of the
police power of the state in the protection of the public health,
safety and morals. An extension of Carringerwould cast doubt on
the validity of any exercise of the police power in less than all the
counties should the General Assembly employ the word "health"
in the usual descriptive formula.
3. Streets.-In North Carolina Turnpike Authority v. Pine
Island, Inc. 65 the court held that a proviso in the Turnpike Authority Act 0 0 that the authority "shall not construct more than one
turnpike project, which project shall not exceed one hundred (100)
miles in length... ."

did not amount to laying out a specific high-

way in violation of the street clause of art. II, § 29. Of major
interest in this case is the court's willingness to consider facts outside the statute itself in determining whether the reasonable classification test of McIntyre v. Clarkson has been satisfied. The
court noted that the primary purpose of the act was to construct
a toll road down the outer banks from the Virginia state line to
the eastern terminus of the Wright Memorial Bridge, thus connecting "an isolated and a unique geographical asset of the State, a rare
tourist attraction," with the Hampton Roads region of Virginia.
While these facts were common knowledge, they appeared nowhere
in the act itself. The court also looked to facts outside the statute
in Treasure City and Pleasants20 8 in applying the reasonable classifiId. at 207, 118 S.E.2d at 410.
265 N.C. 109, 143 S.E.2d 319 (1965).
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 136-89.59 to -89.76 (1964).
7
""N.C. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 757, § 18.1, formerly codified as N.C. GEN.

21"

205

STAT. § 136-89.77 (1964). This section was repealed by N.C. Sess. Laws
1965, ch. 1077.
...
Treasure City v. Clark, 261 N.C. 130, 134 S.E.2d 97 (1964); High
Point Surplus Co. v. Pleasants, 264 N.C. 650, 142 S.E.2d 697 (1965).
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cation test of McIntyre. Thus, it appears that the court will not be
quick to invalidate legislation under McIntyre even though they may
have to search for unexpressed criteria of classification.
4. Extending the time for the assessment or collection of taxes.
-It is somewhat surprising that no cases construing the tax clause
of art. II, § 29, reached the supreme court until 1964. In that year
two cases construed the tax clause, but neither actually ruled on
whether the statute under challenge violated art. II, § 29. The two
cases are important, however, for their intimation that the court is
ready to extend the rule of McIntyre to taxation matters in a proper
case.
Spiers v. Davenport8 9 involved a local act aiding in the administration of the octennial revaluation of real property for taxation
purposes.Y In order to facilitate the work of the Mecklenburg
County board of equalization and review, the act authorized the
board to "continue its sessions for the year 1963 to hear all appeals
which may be brought before it upon the assessed valuations of
property, and to make any adjustments, whensoever it shall hear the
appeal, as of January 1, 1963. ' '21 Under the general law in effect
at that time the board had to complete its duties not later than the
third Monday following its first meeting on the first Monday in
January. 272 The Mecklenburg County board of equalization and
review adjusted the valuation of Spiers' property upward after the
local tax rate had been set, and after Spiers had received and paid
his tax notice, under authority granted to it for extended sitting
by the 1963 local act. The defendant contended that this action of
the Board was taken under a local act extending the time for the
assessment of taxes and was therefore unconstitutional. The court
construed the local act to grant the board authority to hear "appeals
by property owners" after the expiration of the normal time limit;
it did not authorize the board to increase valuations on its own
motion. As concerns art. II, § 29, the court said
209 263 N.C. 56, 138 S.E.2d 762 (1964).
20See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-278 (1965).

27" N.C. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 281. By an earlier act, N.C. Sess. Laws
1961, ch. 916, the Mecklenburg County board had been authorized to con-

tinue meeting until ten days before the time provided by law for fixing the

tax rate for the current year.
22 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-327(e) (1965). This section was amended in
1965 as the direct result of Spiers to authorize the Board to sit until July 1.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-327(e) (Supp. 1965).
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If defendants' interpretation of c. 281, S.L. 1963, is correct, the
statute would do violence to [art. II, § 29]. Everywhere in
North Carolina, except in Mecklenburg County, the power of
the Board of Equalization and Review to increase the value assigned by the assessors to the taxpayer's property terminated
prior to the time the commissioners were required to levy taxes.
Defendants' contention would authorize the Legislature to enact
a special statute extending the time for the assessment of taxes
in Mecklenburg County. The statute ought not to receive a construction which would bring it into direct conflict with constitu273
tional prohibitions.
Iredell County v. Crawford27 4 was an action to foreclose tax
liens on real estate. The defendant owed taxes for the years 1945-55
to the county and for 1937-55 to the city. Under the general law,
tax liens are barred after the lapse of ten years. 5 Since the action
was brought in 1962, defendant would not have been liable under
the general law for taxes due before 1952. However, Iredell and
thirty-four other counties were exempted from the general statute
of limitations. The defendant contended that the exemption clause
was unconstitutional under art. II, § 29, as an act in effect extending the time for the collection of taxes. If the exemption clause were
declared invalid, defendant would be able to plead the general ten
year statute of limitations. The court did not rule on defendant's
contention because he had raised it by a plea in bar rather than by
answer, which is the proper method of pleading a constitutional
defense.
5. Abatement of Nuisances.-The most peculiar case in the
literature on art. II, § 29, is Chadwick v. Salter,276 decided at the
same term as McIntyre. In 1957 the General Assembly enacted
legislation for the protection of the sand dunes along the outer banks
273 263 N.C. at 61, 138 S.E.2d at 765. The court evidently construed the
phrase "assessment or collection of taxes" in art. III, § 29, as meaning, or
at least including, the process of assigning a value to land for taxation
purposes. The phrase probably was intended to mean the process of applying the tax rate selected by the county commissioners to the property value
assigned and arriving at the amount of tax due. See Letter from Henry W.
Lewis to Hamlin L. Wade, Dec. 21, 1964, on file at the Institute of Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
7,262 N.C. 720, 138 S.E.2d 539 (1964).
'"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-422 (1965). Iredell was removed from the
list of exempted counties by N.C. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 885.
-1-254 N.C. 389, 119 S.E.2d 158 (1961).
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One of these acts makes it unlawful to permit
of North Carolina.
livestock to run at large on the banks because they destroy natural
vegetation protecting the dunes. In 1959 a local act recited that
large numbers of livestock still remained on Shakleford Banks in
Carteret County in violation of the 1957 act, provided that this livestock be confiscated by Carteret County, and directed the sheriff to
remove and sell the livestock.17 ' The plaintiff, owner of the livestock concerned, challenged the 1959 local act primarily on grounds
that it amounted to taking his property without due process of
law. The court skirted the due process argument and found that
the act provided for the abatement of a nuisance and was therefore
void under art. II, § 29. Chadwick, while of limited utility as precedent, does illustrate the unexpected twists which the court can
make in using art. II, § 29, to invalidate local acts thought to be
objectionable on principle.
6. Other cases.-The court has entertained appeals in two cases
which challenged local zoning acts as regulations of trade or abatement of nuisances in violation of art. II, § 29.279 In each case the
court declined to discuss the issue raised under art. II, § 29. Of
more immediate interest is the possible application of the regulation
of trade clause of art. II, § 29, to local acts authorizing referenda
on whether the sale of alcoholic beverages will be allowed within a
particular county or city. This question was raised in Fulton v. City
of Morganton s° where the plaintiffs requested an injunction against
the holding of such a referendum, but the issue was mooted when
the voters rejected the proposition before decision was reached in
the supreme court.
D. The Present Vitality of Article II, Section 29.
Compared with similar provisions in the constitutions of other
states, art. II, § 29, of the North Carolina Constitution could never
have had more than a moderate effect on the whole range of possible
local legislation, even in the face of liberal construction in the supreme court. It never touched the formal structure of counties or
""7N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 104B-3 to -7 (1965), as amended, N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 104B-3 to -15 (Supp. 1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 68-42 to -46
(1965).
2 8
7 N. C. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 782.
27
oFox v. Board of Comm'rs, 244 N.C. 497, 94 S.E.2d 482 (1956);
Harrington & Co. v. Renner, 236 N.C. 321, 72 S.E.2d 838 (1952).
280 260 N.C. 345, 132 S.E.2d 687 (1963).
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cities, and purported to limit legislative regulation of their functions, powers and procedures only in a few particulars. Three of
the clauses could have been so construed as to require general legislation in school, road and inferior court matters. They were not,
but these clauses are no longer of great moment because roads and
inferior courts have become the subject of almost total state control
and responsibility, and the state is the dominant partner in the
school system. Local road legislation has disappeared entirely, and
local court legislation has at most two more legislative sessions of
life.28 ' Local school legislation is largely confined to referenda on
consolidation of local administrative units and adjustment of maximum special district tax rates.2 82 Four of the clauses of art. II, § 29,
those relating to non-navigable streams, cemeteries, will and deed
validations, and changing the names of cities and townships, have
never been litigated and the General Assembly is seldom asked to
legislate on these matters.28 3 The clause forbidding refunds of
monies legally paid into the public treasury also has never been
tested in the courts, but no private tax refund bill has passed the
General Assembly for the past two sessions, a trend which seems
likely to continue.2 84
There remain three viable clauses of art. II, § 29: (1) regulation of trade, (2) health, sanitation and the abatement of nuisances,
and (3) prohibiting extensions of the time for "assessment and
collection of taxes." Leaving the question of classification aside for
the moment, what is the probable present impact of these clauses?
In view of the legislative history of art. II, § 29,2 5 it is ironic
that it has come to regulate not the trivial and inconsequential, but
acts having some significance from both state and local points of
.81 See note 6 supra.

These acts are not prohibited by art. II, § 29. Peacock v. Scotland
Co., 262 N.C. 199, 136 S.E.2d 612 (1964).
"8

.8Note a slight exception for acts relating to cemeteries. There have

have been no acts validating wills or deeds or relating to non-navigable
streams within the past several sessions. The 1965 General Assembly was
asked to "confirm" the original spelling of the Town of Hillsborough. N.C.
Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 401.
...
Prior to 1963 the General Assembly routinely authorized refunds of

gasoline taxes to exempt organizations and local governments which had
failed to file their refund applications in time. When the 1961 General
Assembly made local governments subject to the sales tax with provision

for refund on application, the Appropriations Committee decided not to

honor any private bills requesting refunds lost through failure to file on
time. This policy was continued in 1965.
28" See notes 12-18 supra and accompanying text.

1967]

LOCAL LEGISLATION

view. The trade and health clauses have been so interpreted as to
lay open to attack many measures invoking the police power to
regulate matters only remotely connected with health and commerce.
We have seen how the standard recital that action is necessary to
protect the public "health, safety and welfare" can bring an act
authorizing public housing authorities within the health clause,28 0
and how the regulation or prohibition of stock car racing regulates
trade.287 One need only peruse the vast body of federal precedent
expanding the commerce clause of the United States Constitution
as a basis for exercise of the police power by Congress to grasp
the potential scope of the trade clause of art. II, § 29.
Many cases must be decided by the North Carolina Supreme
Court before any clear conception of the scope of the trade clause
of art. II, § 29, can be formed. So far the court has only twice
rejected a claim that a local act regulated trade or health,2 8 8 and
those cases have been all but overruled."8 9 Thus, the existing precedents contain no guidance for determining what is not a regulation
of trade or health or an abatement of a nuisance by legislative act.
Neither has the court offered definitions of "trade," "health," or
"nuisance" sufficient to form the basis for extension by analogy, nor
articulated policies sufficient for analysis to determine what objectives of government must be implemented uniformly throughout the
territorial extent of the state.
Much the same situation exists with regard to the clause prohibiting local acts "extending the time for the assessment or collection of taxes." By apparently giving a double meaning to the word
"assessment," 290 the court has cast doubt on the validity of any
local act relating to the administration of the property tax which
varies the complicated general law time schedules by extension.
The lesson of McIntyre v. Clarkson is that classification can
save the validity of a local act which falls squarely within one of the
28

(1961).

State ex rel. Carringer v. Alverson, 254 N.C. 204, 118 S.E.2d 408

"' Orange Speedway, Inc. v. Clayton, 247 N.C. 528, 101 S.E.2d 406
(1958).
288 State v. Chestnutt, 241 N.C. 401, 85 S.E.2d 297 (1955) (trade); Reed
v. Howerton Eng'r Co., 188 N.C. 39, 123 S.E. 479 (1924) (health).
S.E.2d 406
28' Orange Speedway, Inc. v. Clayton, 247 N.C. 528, 101
(1958) (trade); Drysdale v. Prudden, 195 N.C. 722, 143 S.E. 530 (1928)
(health).
20 Spiers v. Davenport, 263 N.C. 56, 138 S.E.2d 762 (1964). See also
note 273 supra.
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prohibited categories. If the act can be drafted so as to be general
in form, though local or special in fact, it is not a local act for
purposes of the constitution. For example, there are one hundred
counties in North Carolina ranging in population from 272,111 to
4,520, according to the 1960 census. It would be a relatively simple
matter to construct population categories in such a way as to include
each of the five or six largest counties within its own exclusive
class. By adding criteria other than population the possibilities become almost unlimited in the hands of a skillful and ingenious
draftsman. What effect would extensive use of classification for
local government legislation have on existing practices in the North
Carolina General Assembly? To suggest an answer to this question we must first identify and examine the existing practice.

III. LEGISLATIVE PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES FOR
THE HANDLING OF LOCAL BILLS
A. The Local Bill System.
A typical session of the North Carolina General Assembly will
enact from twelve to fourteen hundred pieces of legislation 291 in a
session lasting a little over four months.2 2 Actually only four days
of a normal week are fully devoted to the work of the General
Assembly, leaving around seventy-two sessions for the consideration
of major legislation.2 93 If each bill enacted in 1965 had been allotted
twenty minutes for explanation and debate, each house would have
remained in session for eight hours on its normal working days, leaving no time for committee meetings or other matters. As a matter of
fact, from eight to nine hundred of the enactments of each General
Assembly are considered "local acts" and are passed without explana2. See Appendix III.
2. The Constitution fixes no absolute limit on the length of the session,
but N.C. CONST. art. II, § 28, does set a 120-day limit on the period for
which per diem compensation is paid. By long-standing custom compensation is paid for 120 calendar days, not legislative days. After the expiration
of the pay period, pressure for adjournment becomes intense. See FERRELL,
REPORT TO THE LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N ON LEGISLATIVE SESSION
DAYS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF N.C. (1966), on file at the Institute

of Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
20 No business of any nature is normally transacted on Saturdays or
Sundays. Each house convenes at 8:30 p.m. on Mondays for a short session
but major business is rarely taken up. Most of the work of the General
Assembly is done from Tuesday through Friday.
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tion or debate in assembly-line fashion.2" 4 As fast as the reading clerk
can proceed,2 95 local bills are unanimously enacted by the assembly,
many of whose members may be busily pre-occupied with other
things. The system has worked fairly well, in terms both of effective use of legislative time and of state-local relations, because of
certain well-understood customs pertaining to the handling of local
bills.
1. All local bills are normally referred to a committee specializing in the considerationof local bills, and are explained and debated
there. Members ask for immediate passage of local bills under suspended rules only in emergency situations.-The keystone of the
local bill system is committee study and deliberation. The rules of
each house require that all bills must be referred to committee upon
passing first reading. 296 Each house appoints at least four committees which are concerned exclusively or primarily with local legislation. In the House of Representatives these committees are Counties, Cities and Towns, Justices of the Peace,297 Local Government,
Propositions and Grievances, and Salaries and Fees. Committees
with the same name and function are appointed in the Senate except
for the House committee on Justices of the Peace, which has no
Senate counterpart. Occasionally other committees receive local bills,
especially those relating to courts, elections, finance' s or education.
In both houses the Committees on Counties, Cities and Towns
and Local Government receive the bulk of the local bill load. No
distinction is observed as to the type of bill referred to one or the
other of these committees. Normally Local Government acts as a
supplementary committee when the load on Counties, Cities and
...
See Appendix III. N.C.

SEN.

R. 6 (1965)

specifically provides that

local bills be taken up as the first items on the calendar each day in this

order: local bills on third reading roll call, local bills on second reading roll

call, and local bills on second and third readings voice vote. The same orders

of the day are followed in the House of Representatives though its rules do
not specifically so require.
..An accomplished reading clerk and presiding officer can complete passage of a local bill in fifteen to twenty seconds, depending on the length of
its title.
...N.C. SEN. R. 42 (1965); N.C. HousE R. 36 (1965).
"" This committee's sole task is the preparation of the biennial omnibus

bill appointing justices of the peace throughout the State. This function
will become obsolete upon statewide activation of the District Court system
under N.C. CONST. art. IV.

28 The rules of both houses require all bills in any way affecting the taxing power of the State or any subdivision thereof to be referred to the
Finance Committee. N.C. SEN. R. 41 (1965); N.C. HousE R. 39 (1965).
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Towns becomes heavy. The other committees consider bills relating
to subjects indicated by their titles, except that Propositions and
Grievances considers primarily alcoholic beverage control legislation,
including public bills on this subject. 29 9 It is customary to re-refer
local bills which impinge on the subject matter assigned to other
legislative committees after an initial study in one of the local bill
committees. Re-referral insures that important state-wide policies
will not be adversely affected by seemingly innocuous local legislation.
Local bills altering the governmental structure of counties and
cities are the most numerous and provoke the least legislative study.
It is assumed, almost always correctly, that they have been introduced at the request of the county or city governing board. Others
relate to broad areas in which there are state-wide statutes and welldefined State policies. In these areas, such as education, health and
welfare, courts and alcoholic beverage control, local modifications
of the general laws will often be permitted for good cause shown.
When a local bill seems contrary to a policy administered by one of
the state departments, the department concerned will often suggest
amendments in committee or actively oppose the bill." °0 Legislators
soon develop a "sixth sense" about which types of local bills will
pass without question or objection and which types must be explained and defended. In general, bills which either propose something heretofore unknown in North Carolina or affect state-administered policies and programs will require explanation and justification.
An important, but unofficial, aspect of the local bill system is the
role of the Institute of Government's Legislative Reporting Service. 0 1 Members do not routinely receive copies of all local bills, 02
but each morning they receive a mimeographed digest of all bills
introduced on the previous day, public and local alike, together with
a summary of the prior day's calendar action. The same digest is
"' The antique name of this committee dates from the time when legislation was occasionally initiated by petition. See note 17 sutpra.
...
E.g., authorization is often sought for the use of public school busses
to transport students to some extra-curricular event. The State Department
of Public Instruction has developed a standard form of act for such authorization. See N.C. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 47.
.01
See Ball, The Legislative Service of the. Institute of Government
(1964), staff paper on file at the Institute of Government, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
0

N.C. SEN. R. 38(d) (1965); N.C. HousE R. 35 (1965).

1967]

LOCAL LEGISLATION

405

also sent to all State department heads, and the chief officers and
key employees of all local government agencies throughout the state.
Because of this daily digest of bills, it is difficult to secure the passage of local legislation obnoxious to the state administration or
local officials without their knowledge. The local bill committees
therefore assume that interested persons will request a hearing on
undesirable local legislation, or at least register their objections with
some member of the committee or their representative in the other
house. As an added protection, the Legislative Reporting Service
distributes a weekly digest of calendar action on and introductions
of all local bills relating to each county to every elected or appointed
official of the county and all its cities.
Occasions do arise in which bills must be rushed through the
General Assembly in order to meet some impending deadline. The
most common type of bill in this category relates to local elections.
The General Assembly will usually accede to a request to pass such
bills under suspended rules without committee study, but the introducer must be prepared to explain the bill on the floor and to justify
his request for a suspension of the rules. Caution unusual for local
bills is exercised when immediate passage is requested because this
procedure short-circuits the normal institutional arrangements designed to insure that local legislation has the support of the local
governments it affects and is innocuous from a state-wide point of
view. A member who procures, under suspended rules, the passage
of legislation he knows to be controversial from a state-wide viewpoint runs a serious risk of injuring his political effectiveness among
his colleagues.
2. A local bill is introduced only after consultation with every
legislator representing the counties or cities affected by it.-Legislative courtesy decrees that every member shall be consulted on
legislation affecting his constituents unless the bill is a public bill of
state-wide application. On rare occasions local bills will be introduced and passed over the objection of a member whose constituents
are affected, but these exceptions almost always fall into one of two
narrow categories: (a) the bill has the support of the majority
party in the General Assembly 0 3 and the representative or senator
...
This situation most often arises in the House of Representatives.
Usually the senator representing the county is a member of the majority
party and assumes the role in respect to local legislation which would normal-

ly be performed by the representative. Thus, local bills, supported by the
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is a member of the minority party, or (b) the bill has the support of
a majority of a multi-member delegation from the county or district.
When there is no strong policy among the supporters of a public
bill that all counties and cities should be included within its terms,
legislators will usually be permitted to exempt their counties from
the bill without question. s0 4 Sometimes a blank amendment form
is left with the Principal Clerk and members who wish to exempt
their counties come forward and write the names of their counties
into the amendment. This custom prevails primarily in the House
of Representatives.
3. A member introducinga local bill normally takes full responsibility for it.-One of the assumptions of the local bill system is that
local bills are non-controversial in the sense that they are of little or
no concern to anyone outside the county or city affected. This does
not mean that the bill is non-controversial at the local level, but that
the introducer has consulted those persons who are interested in or
affected by the bill and has made his own independent judgment that
it is in the best interests of the county or city concerned. Furthermore, the great majority of local bills do not originate with the
legislators themselves; they are drafted by and introduced at the
request of the county or city governing board or some other local
agency such as the board of education. Thus, while the members of
the General Assembly in theory possess virtually absolute power over
the local governments within their constituency, this power is seldom
used against the determined efforts of those local governments.
When exercised at all, it is far more common for a legislator to
refuse to introduce or support measures or to exempt his county
from public bills, rather than to positively advocate bills repugnant
to local officials. In very rare instances a legislator has appeared in
Raleigh with a burning zeal to reform local government at all costs.
Legislative courtesy will assuage his passion in the house in which
he sits and then quietly consign his bills to oblivion in the other
house.
local Democratic Party of a county whose representative is a Republican will
originate in the Senate. This bill will pass the House without regard to the
opposition of the Republican representative. Where party disagreements are
not involved, the House will usually accord a Republican representative the
same courtesies as to his local bills as it would were he a Democrat.
...
This practice is the one situation in which a representative or senator
often exercises his power of local legislation without consulting his constituents.
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Occasionally a member will procure the passage of a local bill
that he does not personally support. He may agree to introduce it,
or at least not to oppose its passage, without lending it his personal
support. This may be done in one of three ways: (a) the bill may
be introduced "by request"; (b) another member may be asked to
introduce the bill (usually the chairman of the committee to which
it would normally be referred); or (c) it may be introduced in
the other house.
4. Local bills which are reported favorably by committee are
ordinarily passed unanimously without debate or explanation.Normally the debate on local legislation occurs, if at all, in committee when the bill is explained. In this manner only those members
serving on one of the local bill committees become directly involved
in the process of local legislation except as introducers and in the
daily routine of enactment. Even local roll-call bills are expedited. 0 5
Sometimes full floor debate on a local bill will occur when partisan
politics are involved, or when there is a clash between the supporters
of a state-wide policy and members who are determined to obtain
modifications for their county or city.
5. Introduction of local bills near adjournment time is not
favored.-As the time for adjournment nears, the General Assembly
usually finds itself unable to deal as extensively and leisurely with
local matters as it could early in the session. When the situation
becomes critical, non-essential local bills are the first items to be
trimmed from the agenda. The slightest hint of controversy spells
the doom of a local measure introduced after the Calendar Committees have been appointed. Beginning in 1953 there have been attempts to regulate by rule the introduction of local bills late in the
session. Senate Rule 40, first adopted in 1953, requires that all
local bills must be introduced not later than April 1. The rule has
not proved effective since the vast majority of local bills are intro""N.C. CONST. art. II, § 14, requires passage on three separate days with
roll call votes on second and third readings of all bills to "raise money on
the credit of the State, or to pledge the faith of the State, directly or indirectly, for the payment of any debt, or to impose any tax upon the people

of the State, or to allow the counties, cities or towns to do so. . . ." Local
bills in this category are grouped as the first items on the calendar. The
full roll is called only for the first bill, after which the "short roll call" is
used. In this procedure, the reading clerk calls the first and last names on
the roll, all members present vote in unison, and the roll call tally for the
first bill is recorded for all subsequent bills. A local roll call bill thus takes
no more time than a voice vote bill, except that it must be brought up again
on the next legislative day.
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duced in the House, and the Senate has usually suspended Rule 40
on request. The 1965 regular session, however, made a concerted
effort to pass and enforce a deadline binding on both houses. A
joint resolution was adopted which ruled all local bills out of order
after April 15 unless the consent of the Rules Committee was obtained for introduction.30 The resolution had the noticeable effect
of precipitating over 200 local bill introductions in the last few days
before the deadline. While local introductions continued after the
deadline with permission of the Rules Committees, the deadline did
alleviate adjournment congestion to some extent and may have set a
precedent for future sessions.
B. The Effect of Classificationon the Local Bill System.
At the outset we should bear in mind that classification for local
legislation purposes will not have a major effect on legislative customs in North Carolina, even should it be carried to extremes. Because of the very limited scope of art. II, § 29, the great majority
of local bills do not fall within any of the restricted categories of
legislation. Only fifty to one hundred bills in each session, by rather
liberal estimate, would even remotely invoke art. II, § 29, should
present trends continue.
Use of classification for those bills subject to art. II, § 29, would
have three primary effects on the local bill system. Such bills would
be placed on the public calendar, the current procedures for exemption of counties from public bills relating to trade, health, and
property tax procedures would be altered, and some bills which would
have been enacted but for a classification scheme will be defeated.
1. The Public Calendar.-Forthe purposes of this discussion
the major distinction between public and local bills is the attention
they receive on the floor of the General Assembly. Each public bill,
upon receiving a favorable report from committee, is assigned a
floor manager in each house whose duty it is to explain the bill on
the floor, to answer questions about it, and to defend it in debate.
When the bill is reached on the calendar, the floor manager is recognized by prearrangement and briefly explains what the bill intends
to accomplish. The floor manager then customarily yields for questions from other members, or may immediately begin debate. Even
the most non-controversal public bills thus consume a fair amount
...
N.C. Sess. Laws 1965, res. 47.
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of time. If the measure is the least bit complicated, the time consumed by desultory questioning of the floor manager may often
disrupt the presiding officer's work plan for the day.
2. Exemption from Public Bills.-Where there is no strong
policy among the supporters of a public bill that all local government units in the state shall be subject to it, wholesale
exemptions often occur. Sometimes the confusion is so great that
action on the bill must be postponed until the Principal Clerk can
determine which counties are in and which are out. When the measure is novel or complicated, legislators often exempt their counties
on nothing more than suspicion or misunderstanding. At other
times, bills which otherwise would have failed by large majorities
are allowed to pass with most of the counties exempted. Also, a
local bill sometimes becomes public by the addition of counties
through floor amendments. If these bills fall within the categories
of art. II, § 29, exemption or inclusion of local government units by
name alone will no longer be sufficient. If exemption or inclusion
is desired, a carefully drafted classification scheme will have to be
devised. Since this would be almost impossible to do on the floor,
the bill would have to be put over for another day while someone
attempted to ascertain which counties wish to come in or out of the
bill and how to devise a proper classification scheme.
3. Defeat through Classification.-While ingenuity is seldom
unable to hit upon a "reasonable" classification scheme for widely
disparate units, the bill may not be worth the time and effort. Particularly where legislators want exemption of their counties from
public bills, classification may often mean defeat for the bill. If the
objectors are adamant and no reasonable classification is apparent,
supporters of the bill must choose between a lengthy floor fight or
defeat. Also, there is always the risk that an involved classification
scheme may not meet the court's conception of "reasonableness."
In either event beneficial measures may be lost, an inordinate amount
of time consumed, and more important matters displaced.
Given the potential scope of art. II, § 29, as construed by the
courts, the practices and procedures for enactment of local bills
which have been slowly perfected over many years, and the probable
effect of classification on these practices and procedures, and assuming that some regulation of local legislation is desirable, what features of the present system should be strengthened, what features
should be eliminated, and what innovations could improve it?
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EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Scholars commenting on the problem of local legislation in the
United States agree on at least two things: undisciplined use of the
power to legislate individually for local governments is harmful to
both the central legislative body and local governments, and attempts to restrict the practice by constitutional amendment have
been either unsuccessful or more harmful than beneficial.30 7 It is
easy to make an exaggerated case against local legislation: it drains
the energies of the legislators from more important matters ;308 it
violates fundamental principles of democracy by denying local people control over local matters; it encourages provincialism among
legislators ;309 it is susceptible to corruption through the lobby;31°

and it clutters the statute books and makes discovery of applicable
law difficult."'
Whatever may have been the experience of other states or other
times, only one of these objections rings true in modern North
Carolina experience. Despite the number and length of local enactments by a typical General Assembly, local legislation does not preoccupy the members or the daily sessions of the two houses. While
... ADRIAN, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 120 (1960); COUNCIL OF
STATE GOVERNMENTS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS 146-47, 152 (1946); FORDOHAM, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 60 (1949);

GRAVES, AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENT 283-89 (4th ed. 1953); HoRAcK,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 452-53 (2d ed. 1954); LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS 540-48, 570 (1935); WALKER, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

341 (1948).

.O See LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS

540-47 (1935). Writing in 1935,

Luce identified this as the major evil of local and special legislation. He
quotes at length from the message of Governor Grover Cleveland to the
New York legislature of 1884. Governor Kitchin's 1911 message to the
North Carolina General Assembly bears a striking resemblance to the Cleveland message. Luce notes that the Cleveland-Kitchin attitude toward local
legislation was not so much an opposition to it per se, but more a rallying
point for the indifference many legislators exhibited toward pressing public
issues. Governors could not get their legislatures to share their concern for
broad social problems, and evidently believed that if the legislature could
be prevented from considering local matters they would be more free to
give needed attention to public matters.

...
Van Hecke, Four Suggested Improvements in the North Carolina
Legislative Process, 9 N.C.L. REv. 1, 11 (1930). Dean Van Hecke wrote:
"with almost every member of the two houses primarily interested in getting
through a number of bills relating only to his home community, the whole

General Assembly is locally minded. Only a few of the outstanding leaders

are state-conscious."
"I CHAMBERLAIN, LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES: NATIONAL AND STATE 237-38

(1936); LUCE, LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES 368-69 (1924).
...
LucE, LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS 546-47 (1935).
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formal decision-making power is lodged in the General Assembly
rather than in local governments, in the majority of instances the
actual decision is made locally. Examples of abuse of power or
actual corruption could probably be identified, but they have been
quite rare. And to attribute provincial attitudes to the tradition of
local legislation is to put the cart before the horse. It is quite true,
however, that the North Carolina system of local legislation makes
it difficult to determine what law applies where.
Although it was intended to remedy or forestall some of these
problems, art. II, § 29, of the North Carolina Constitution has
actually contributed little toward regulating the process of local legislation. It has encouraged the enactment of several comprehensive
general laws, but for the most part its influence has been minimal.
Rather than acting as a strong deterrent to local legislation, art. II,
§ 29, has been largely ignored.
Dean Fordham observes that the question of whether a given
act violates a constitutional prohibition against local legislation is
not suited to the judicial process."' 2 Whether one phrases this objection in terms of the judicial process or in terms of constitutional
standards for legislation, the point .is that the courts are not the
proper forum for testing the ultimate wisdom of local government
acts where individual rights are not immediately involved. Constitutions and judges cannot insure wisdom in the legislative process;
they can insure that individual liberties are not endangered by the
lack of it. In this context constitutional limitations on the authority
of legislatures to regulate local government make little practical
sense. Individual liberties are seldom involved in litigation involving these provisions, and when they are, other more developed and
useful constitutional concepts are close at hand. The two groups
that local legislation amendments were intended to protect, local governments and members of the legislature, have no occasion to invoke
them in court. Rather, they are invoked by individuals opposed to
specific local acts on political grounds, by bond attorneys, and by
litigants who find them useful supplementary weapons in suits with
objectives quite collateral to the process of local legislation.
Alternatively to ineffective constitutional provisions, legislatures
themselves can and should clarify and observe the principles of wise
and efficient local legislation. Though the skeptic may scoff at the
notion of internal legislative reform, experience tends to support the
.12 FoRDHAm,

LOCAL GovERNMENT LAw

60 (1949).
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proposition that lasting reform is possible when it has the support
of legislative leaders and an informed public. The remainder of
this section will discuss, without attempting to be exhaustive, a few
basic principles which, when clarified, understood and applied to
the process of local legislation in North Carolina, could tend to
improve the process without unduly hampering the ultimate authority of the General Assembly to regulate local government-an authority it must have to create coherent state policy.
It bears emphasis that these principles are statements of policy
preference, not inviolable rules. In some contexts any one or several
of them should and will yield to over-riding considerations. No one
of them deserves the dignity of constitutional or statutory sanction.
Rather, they might be thought of as beacons marking the channel
toward intelligent and efficient use of legislative power.3 13 If formally expressed in any manner, some of them might be incorporated
into the rules of the two houses of the General Assembly. Rules
can be suspended when necessary; constitutions cannot.
1. Prefer general laws to local acts.-This is the basic
policy expressed by constitutional amendments restricting the
power of local legislation, and it is valid despite the failure of the
courts to enforce it. It calls for deference to inclusive interests in
preference to exclusive interests, except where indulgence of the
latter is in the common interest.314 In less abstract terms, local
government policy should be state-wide in scope and expressed
through general laws except where local modifications can be justified as furthering the long-range goals of the state, or allowing innovative experimentation in local government. With the major exceptions of roads, schools, courts, and fiscal control, it is not an
overstatement to observe that in recent years North Carolina has
" Professor Adrian observes:
There is no reason why legislators would necessarily choose to abuse
their potential powers of supervision over local government, and they
have by no means always done so. . . . The degree of legislative
activity in dealing with minute details of local government seems to
depend more upon tradition in the individual state than upon any
other factor.
ADRIAN, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 120 (1960).
...
I owe this formulation in particular and the approach to these principles in general to Professors McDougal and Lasswell of the Yale Law
School. See e.g., McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & BURKE, PUBLIC ORDER OF THE
OCEANS

(1963).
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preferred local acts in structuring its local governments without
clearly thinking out general law alternatives. This has not always
been the case, as it amply illustrated by the initial movement toward
uniformity which culminated in the adoption of art. II, § 29, and
the resurgence of uniformity policies in the North Carolina Supreme
Court in the two decades following the depression.
In the words of the North Carolina Constitution's Declaration
of Rights, "a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles" is one
of the marks of good government.315 With respect to local legislation, the time may be ripe for yet another recurrence to the fundamental principle that state policy for local government should be
uniform where practicable. The first step in this direction must be
a shift in legislative perspectives of local legislation away from
permissiveness and toward restrictiveness. Unless this shift takes
place, there is small hope for significant improvement over the
present situation.
Turning from perspectives to actions, potentially the single most
effective measure to alleviate the burden of unnecessary local acts
and indulging the basic preference for general laws would be a
thorough and comprehensive revision of the existing general laws
relating to local government. One side-effect of the recent preference for local acts has been gradual obsolescence of much of the
general law." 6 Particularly with regard to cities, the general laws
have not been revised because it has been so much simpler to obtain
local modifications for each individual city. To gain some idea of
how a modern city operates in North Carolina, one turns not to the
general statutes but to recent charter revisions. Similarly, a researcher attempting to draw a picture of county government in
North Carolina in 1966 would be misled in many respects by the
general laws. If he were diligent enough to search for patterns
among the thousands of local acts, he would discover that a surprising degree of uniformity in fact exists in both city and county
government. But it is a uniformity which has developed piece-meal
through local legislation. It is doubtful that a modern local government code for the North Carolina of the 1960's would propose
drastic innovations of the order precipitated by the financial crisis
of the 1930's, but it could become the starting point for renewed
35
N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 29.
...
Esser, Local Legislation in the 1951 General Assembly-II, Popular
Government, Sept. 1951, p. 12.
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assessment of the state-local partnership in an increasingly complex
federal system.
2. Discourage local acts affecting the access of individuals to
the courts and the franchise.-Conceding the need for flexibility in the structure and powers of local government, there
appear to be few valid and pressing reasons for wide variations in
the laws regulating the manner in which individuals may invoke
the judicial power of the state or exercise the franchise. Yet local
acts commonly vary procedures for condemnation of land, for challenging special benefit assessments, and for appealing these and
similar local administrative decisions to the courts. Statutes of limitations may be varied by local act, tort immunity may be granted,
waived or modified, or special conditions prescribed for bringing
suit against local governments. The ease and freedom with which
the citizen may vote in state and national elections may depend on
17
local variations in the election laws, such as "anti-single-shot" acts.1
Local governing boards may be so apportioned as to deny equal
representation to all citizens in the unit. While good and sufficient
reasons may exist in special circumstances to justify any of these
types of local acts, the burden should be on the advocate of them to
show why they are desirable.
3. Discourage local acts varying punishment for crime.Here again it is difficult to justify variations in the maximum
punishment for the same criminal act when committed in county A rather than county B. Flexibility may well be necessary in
defining criminal acts in different portions of the state-a principle
recognized by the grant of ordinance-making power to municipalities-but this proposition does not necessarily imply a need for flexibility in the limits of judicial authority to impose maximum and
minimum penalties. Where such a need does exist it should be
clearly demonstrated.
4. Presume against local acts introduced without the support
of the governing board of the local government affected.-Most
local acts originate with the local governing boards concerned, but
this practice often breaks down where party or factional controversy is involved, or where acts are sought from personal and private motives. Thus, this principle may be further analyzed into a
""These acts provide that where the voter is directed to vote for more
than one person in a group of candidates, he must vote for all vacancies to
be filled or the ballot will not be counted.
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presumption against local acts intended to give a local political advantage to one party or faction over its opponents, and a presumption against local acts intended to further purely private interests.
In terms of the effective use of legislative resources, the local
acts most wasteful of time and energy are those prompted by party
and factional disputes at the local level. It has not been unknown
for legislative committees to hold extensive public hearings on the
most trivial matters, or for acts relatively inconsequential from a
state-wide point of view to occupy more time on the floor of the
legislature than such major pieces of legislation as the Uniform
Commercial Code' 81 Heretofore this type of local legislation,
though comparatively rare, has been tolerated by the General Assembly partly as a variety of patronage, but largely because of the
political complexion of the two houses. Through the 1965 General
Assembly, each county had at least one member of the House of
Representatives, and the Republican opposition in each house was
too small to effectively oppose anything. Two recent developments
may have a significant influence on the willingness of the legislature
to act as the arbitrator of local controversy. First, the reapportioned
House of Representatives no longer contains one Representative
from each county. Even a good number of those counties with the
requisite population ratio have been combined into House districts
with smaller counties, with the result that only twenty of the one
hundred counties constitute single-county districts. It remains to be
seen whether the House of Representatives will feel less inclined to
become deeply involved in local disputes when most of its members
must run in more than one county. Second, the Republican Party
made significant inroads into Democratic control of state and local
government in the 1966 elections. Republican strength in each
house is at the highest peak since 1929, and many counties have
elected Republicans to local office for the first time since 1896.
Should the 1966 elections be the harbinger of a trend toward a twoparty system in North Carolina, the effect on local legislation will
be immediate and obvious insofar as Democratic control of local
government through the General Assembly is concerned.
Should the two factors just discussed actually develop a change
.8This occurred in 1965 when the House of Representatives undertook
extended debate on N.C. Sess. Laws 1965, c. 723, a bill extending the terms

of the incumbent county commissioners of Carteret County past the next
regular election. The matter was cast as a Democratic-Republican controversy, though both party and factional dispute was involved.
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in legislative perspectives toward local legislation, the presumption suggested against local acts introduced without the consent of the local governing board might be somewhat softened.
Legislators less inclined to become deeply involved in local disputes
probably will be less inclined to introduce such bills in the first place.
It would then be reasonable to assume that the simple fact of introduction implies a serious consideration of the matter by the legislator himself, and a final decision that the bill is in the best interests
of the local government. Nevertheless, the introduction of bills of
this nature, should still call for explanation and justification. The
procedures for implementing this general policy preference might
be embodied in a rule of each house of the General Assembly
similar to the requirements of the New Jersey Constitution.3 1 In
that state formal certification that a local bill has been requested or
approved by the governing board of the unit affected is necessary
for passage of local bills. If similar certificates or oral assurances
by the introducer were required by legislative rule in North Carolina, the normal practice of requiring explanation and justification
for a request to suspend the rules should adequately serve the purpose of insuring that serious consideration is given to locally-opposed bills.
Another aspect of the general policy under discussion is legislation sought by private persons from personal motives. This facet
of the legislator's task is one he usually neither seeks nor relishes.
The most common example is a request to vary the fish and game
laws. While individual pressure for local legislation never can or
should be entirely ended in a representative democracy, public understanding that favorable consideration of a proposal by a local governing board is ordinarily essential for success could do much to
alleviate the annoyance of trivial, frivolous or unreasonable demands.
5. Insure that all local legislation has been adequately studied
by committee for substance, form, necessity, style, and conformity
to general law patterns.-The casual manner in which local acts are
typically passed by the North Carolina General Assembly has generally encouraged inattention to the finer points of legislative drafting. From a lawyer's point of view, much of the legislative product
is perplexing and frustrating, often leading to fresh local acts in...
N.J. CONST. art. IV, § VII,

10.
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tended to dispel the confusion produced by poorly drafted or illconceived bills. The constitutions of all the states but North Carolina
allow the executive veto, partially at least to prevent just this state
of affairs. North Carolina alone has no institutional arrangements
in its legislative process designed to prevent hasty, poorly drafted,
or unnecessary acts.
In 1952 Professor Henry Lewis noted that:
Any extended practical experience in the North Carolina General Assembly is sufficient to bring home the unfortunate truth
that a need exists for some form of revision agency. The rules of
the two houses, however, make no provision for handling the
problem. The committees are left completely responsible. Since
their interest will necessarily center around the substantive merits
of a proposal they have little time left to consider the formal and
technical aspects of the particular bill, nor, for that matter,
3 20
whether it is a duplication of existing laws.
The situation was again identified as a major defect in the local bill
system by Professor Alexander McMahon in 1957. He thought
that:
If a procedure were established to screen and weed out unnecessary local legislation . . . and if general legislation were recurrently examined to make certain that it left in local hands as much
discretion as legislative policy would allow, the amount of local
legislation would be drastically reduced and legislators' time
32
could be devoted to state-wide matters. 1
Lewis' recommendations, directed to public and local bills alike,
called for the creation of a standing committee in each house to
which all bills would be referred before reference to one of the
other committees.32 2 This new committee would review all bills,
committee substitutes, and committee and floor amendments from
the standpoint of style, necessity and effect. The committee would
make no report on the merits of the bill, but would recommend redrafting where necessary and call attention to duplication of existing
law. Whether a single committee could adequately discharge all
the tasks Lewis foresaw for it is doubtful, but the basic idea is
sound. If performance of these tasks by legislative committee is not
found feasible for whatever reason, other possibilities include dele120LEWIS, LEGISLATIVE ComiTTEEs IN NORTH CAROLINA

46-47 (1952).

...LEwIs, LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES IN NORTR CAROLINA

47 (1952).

...
McMahon, County Home Rule and Local Legislation, Popular Government, March 1957, p. 7.
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gating these duties to a permanent law revision commission, the
Attorney General's legislative drafting service, the Legislative Research Commission, or the Local Government Commission, all of
which could be staffed for the purpose.
Along with the creation of a revision agency, the existing practices with respect to committee study of local bills need to be
strengthened. In theory, committee study is the foundation of the
present local bill system, but in practice committee study of local
bills is minimal or non-existent. This state of affairs is due partly
to a lack of concern, but also to the fact that only two committees in
each house receive the large majority of all local bills, while many
of the public bill committees have almost no work to do. Re-referral
of local bills touching matters supervised by other standing committees is only sporadically observed. While it may not be practicable for local bills to receive the same close scrutiny that public bills
customarily receive, they deserve more attention than they have been
receiving.
6. Presume against local bills introduced late in the session.The 1965 General Assembly attempted to restrict the introduction
of local bills late in the session, with qualified success. 3 This effort
should be continued, and consideration given to a rule providing that
no local bills will be brought to a vote after a given date. Generally,
if a local matter is important enough to require an act of the General Assembly, it is important enough to receive adequate attention.
This is not possible late in the session because of the adjournment
rush. Another more stringent possibility is to require the introduction of all local bills within the first thirty days of the session.
V. EPILOGUE
It has not been possible to investigate in this article the
probable effect in other states of constitutional restraint on the
power of the legislature to regulate local government and its
corrollary, constitutional home rule, on the ability of state government to fulfill its potential as a full working partner with the federal
government in what is often called the new federalism. Since the
creation of the United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in 1959, the attention of scholars, politicians
and interested citizens has been increasingly directed toward reassessing the role of state and local government in the federal system
"' See note 306 supra and accompanying text.
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with special emphasis on self-imposed constitutional barriers to the
fulfillment of their full potential by the states.3 24 Professors Keefe
and Ogul conclude
It is not true, of course, that the shortcomings of state government today are attributable solely to the constitutional fetters
placed on the legislature. .

.

. [But] the root-cause of the im-

mobilization of state government is the constitution. Under the
circumstances, when the states seem unable (or unwilling) to
find answers to the hard problems, the 'states' rights' doctrine
which is invoked appears to be no more than a handy myth to
resist federal action. The dilemma of the states involves their
capacity to act. It is unlikely that an awakening will take place
in the states, or the flight of power to Washington be reversed,
until state constitutions are reshaped to 325
provide an appropriate
legal framework for effective state action.

The 1966 American Assembly found that
In many states, legislatures operate under severe constitutional
limitations on their powers. Provisions safeguarding the rights
of individual citizens and basic procedural protections to insure
the integrity of legislative processes should be preserved. Constitutions should, however, leave legislatures as unhampered as
possible, encouraging the development of their own self-reliance ....326
A provocative report issued in July of 1966 by the Research and
Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development
found that local government in the United States in general is not
adequate to the challenge offered by expanding federal responsibility
for the economic and social development of the nation."" The Committee recommended major surgery for local government, especially
2' See these Commission reports: APPORTIONMENT OF STATE LEGISLATURES
(1962) ; IMPACT oF FEDERAL URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS ON LOCAL
GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING (1964); INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS IN THE POVERTY PROGRAM (1966); STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT (1962); STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RESTRiTION ON LoCAL TAXING POWERS
(1962); STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS UPON THE
STRUCTURAL, FUNCTIONAL AND PERSONNEL POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

(1962).
...

KEEFE & OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

6
"'
THrE

BLY

38 (1964).

AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, REPORT OF THE TWENTY-NINTH AssEM-

(1966); Keefe, The Functions and Powers of the State Legislatures,

and Wahlke, Organization and Procedure, in

THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY,
STATE LEGISLATURES IN AMERICAN POLITICS (ed. Heard 1966).
7
.. COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, MODERNIZING LOCAL GovERNMENT (1966).
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a reduction in the number of units, an end to extensive overlapping
jurisdictions of general and special purpose units, contraction of the
number of elected officials, and expansion of local authority to deal
with local problems, among others.3 28 It is doubtful that effective
modernization of local government can be achieved where state
legislatures are tied to constitutional home rule and limits on their
power to provide for the structure, powers, machinery, and territorial jurisdiction of individual local governments. Unless carried to
ridiculous extremes, class legislation has not proved adequate to the
task heretofore. While the North Carolina tradition of local legislation probably could not be transplanted to other states with differing attitudes toward local responsibility or with a strong two-party
system, it does demonstrate that institutional arrangements can be
devised which leave the legislature free to tailor local governments
to the circumstances of the individual case and at the same time
entrust a large measure of power and responsibility to them. The
nation has lived long enough under nineteenth century attitudes toward the role of the state legislature in the ordering of local government. It is time that these attitudes were objectively re-examined.
Id. at 17-19.
I28
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